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SUMMARY
Public health emergencies continue to pose serious threats to human lives and well-
being of the world population. The 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa and the 2016
Zika virus outbreak in South and North America underscores the challenges post by some
of these highly infectious diseases even as healthcare has been revolutionized over the past
century with medical science and technology. Infectious diseases are one of the most com-
mon yet most serious types of public health crisis due to several reasons: high infectivity,
difficulties in prevention, labor-intensive intervention, diagnosis, and treatment. This is
amplified by the mobility of human population enabled by transportation technologies. To
react efficiently and effectively to waves of infectious disease outbreaks, decision-makers
and public health officers must quickly analyze the current situation and predict the po-
tential trend of an outbreak, evaluate multiple countermeasures and strategies, and imple-
ment an intervention plan that optimizes utilization of the available (limited) resource while
achieving the best containment results. Additionally, these decisions need to be made in
real time as any delay in this process may result in severe outcomes, including more infec-
tions, economic loss, and even lives loss.
In this dissertation, we advance infectious diseases models with applications in medical
countermeasure operations and biosurveillance. We first propose a general-purpose model-
ing framework for infectious disease outbreaks and discuss how it can be used to facilitate
decision making to achieve best containment results. We demonstrate how this modeling
technique can be computerized and used to support public health operations.
In the first chapter, we describe a general-purpose modeling framework for infectious
disease. By expanding and abstracting the traditional compartmental models widely used
for disease propagation dynamics, our modeling framework is highly generic and can be
xi
viewed as a metamodel for compartmental models. We focus on the models for contact-
based diseases and vector-borne diseases and apply it to two real-life scenarios: 1) the Zika
virus outbreaks in Brazil and Puerto Rico, and 2) the avian influenza outbreaks in Egypt and
the United States. We discuss how this generic modeling framework can be tailored and
parameterized to suit the properties of different diseases at different regions and investigate
the impact of different intervention strategies.
In the second chapter, we equip the disease modeling framework with an optimiza-
tion engine to determine the optimal resource allocation strategy during an outbreak. We
investigate the impact of point-of-dispensing (PODs) for rapid medical countermeasures
dispensing during an outbreak. We analyze its usage for a regional smallpox outbreak in
the state of Georgia and investigate vaccination strategies for maximum health protection.
In the third chapter, we explain the design and functionalities of an enterprise software
package, the RealOpt suite. Designed at Georgia Institute of Technology in collaboration
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention since 2005, RealOpt is a modular-
ized system. This chapter focuses on one aspect of RealOpt: an expanded module known
as RealOpt-Regional. We discuss the design structure of the general RealOpt framework
and its ease-of-usage by public health personnel for emergency preparedness and actual
responses. We then demonstrate usage in multiple aspects of public health emergency re-
sponse, including facility location optimization, resource allocation optimization, inventory
and transportation management, and cost-effectiveness analysis of strategies.
xii
CHAPTER 1
DISEASE PROPAGATION MODELS FOR BIOSURVEILLANCE
In this chapter, we propose a general-purpose modeling framework for infectious disease
propagation with applications in public health practice, biosurveillance, and medical re-
search. This modeling framework is an extension and generalization of the compartmental
models and can be used to monitor the spread of pandemic outbreaks, evaluate contain-
ment strategies, and help decision-makers understand the biological properties of different
diseases. We discuss two applications of this framework in modeling and containing Zika
virus outbreaks and avian influenza outbreaks.
1.1 Literature Review
Infectious diseases continue to be one of the major causes of mortalities in many countries
as of the 21st century. They are the third leading cause of death in the United States and
the leading cause worldwide [29]. In addition, the infectious agents such as bacteria and
viruses continuously evolve and create new challenges for human beings [164]. The recent
Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2014 and the Zika virus outbreak in South America
and The Caribbean in 2016 indicate that combating emerging infectious diseases is still one
of the most important tasks for emergency response.
Mathematical models have been shown to be important techniques in understanding
the underlying mechanisms of the spread and control of infectious diseases by utilizing the
available information and transforming it into the knowledge of the disease, then providing
strategies and guidelines to prevent the disease from becoming a global pandemic. Coupled
with computer simulation, mathematical models are powerful tools to provide valuable
insights into disease outbreaks, understand the transmission characteristics, test hypothesis,
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and assess and evaluate containment strategies. Mathematical epidemiology models have
been studied extensively for many years, dating back to the smallpox model first formulated
by Daniel Bernoulli in the 18th century [28].
The foundations of mathematical models for infectious diseases were developed in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries [34]. These studies on mathematical models can be
briefly separated into two categories: deterministic and stochastic epidemiology models.
1.1.1 Deterministic Epidemiology Models
Deterministic models have long been applied to study the infectious disease epidemiology.
Hamer developed a discrete time model to understand the recurrence of measles in 1906, in
which he assumed that the number of new infections depends on the product of the density
of susceptible and infectious populations [107]. This idea sets the foundation for future
compartmental models. In 1911, Ross developed a system of differential equations using
a host-vector structure for the control of malaria [187]. Other deterministic models were
also developed for multiple purposes in the early 20th century [16], until Kermack and
McKendrick published a series of papers in the 1920s and 1930s, developing the theory of
SIR models and other compartmental models [123–125, 158].
Kermack–McKendrick Model
The original form of Kermack–McKendrick model is a compartmental differential equa-
tion model consists of susceptible, infectious, and recovered populations with coefficients
relative to the distribution of age in the population. Kermack and McKendrick also studied
the threshold conditions for this system for the occurrence of an epidemic outbreak. Many
mathematical models for pandemics were developed afterwards based on their framework.
For example, Capasso and Serio generalized the deterministic compartmental model with
an interaction term and characterized the occurrence of infections with a nonlinear bounded
2
function [41]. Instead of unlimited contacts between individuals at a uniform rate, Diek-
mann et al. introduced a population contact structure and studied the effect of repeated
contacts within a group of “acquaintances” [65]. Clancy and Piunovskiy studied the model
that replaces the infection rate function in the original Kermack–McKendrick model with
a dynamic infection rate adjusted by the total population in the system and studied the
optimal isolation policy to intervene under different conditions [51].
Other extensions and generalizations based on the Kermack–McKendrick theory are
still topics focused by recent researchers. Li and Zou studied the compartmental model
in which the infectious disease has a fixed latent period and formulated the SIR structure
for a population living in two patches [149]. Pathak et al. replaced the constant infection
rate with an asymptotically homogeneous transmission function and derived the stability
condition of the model [177]. Xu developed a diffusive Kermack–McKendrick epidemic
model with a latent period and determined conditions of the existence of traveling waves
solutions of the system [216]. Inaba extended the compartmental model to recognize indi-
vidual heterogeneity, expanding the definition of compartments to genetic, psychological,
or behavioral characteristics of population [111]. Disraelly et al. extended the methodology
of Human Response Injury Profile (HRIP) which uses time-based progression to determine
casualty and fatality estimations from infections. Based on the compartmental model, they
introduced an injury profile sub-model based on the severity of the symptoms to describe
the progression of illness at a detailed granularity [69]. Refer to Allen [8], Daley and Gani
[60], Hethcote [110], and Breda et al. [36] for complete reviews of the compartmental
epidemiology models proposed based on the work of Kermack and McKendrick.
Population-Dependent Models
The original Kermack–McKendrick model has age-dependent recovery and transmission
rates. While the theory of the simple SIR model treats these parameters as constants,
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population-dependent compartmental models are also well studied. Brauer considered
models with nonlinear population dynamics with permanent removal and studied the stabil-
ity of endemic equilibrium the model [35]. Pugliese studied a compartmental model with
no recovery and density-dependent mortality and incidence rate and examined the effect of
vaccination [180]. Zhou and Hethcote analyzed an SIS type and considered various demo-
graphic structures including recruitment-death, logistic, decay and growth [218]. Roberts
described the spread of fatal infectious diseases with a system of nonlinear integral equa-
tions regulated by population density-dependent constraints and compared this model with
the ODE-based compartmental models [186]. Kuperman and Abramson modeled different
structures of populations and their interactions within small world networks and studied
the spread of infections within the network [131]. For a complete review of population-
dependent dynamic disease models, see Anderson and May [11].
Models with Passive Immunity and Vaccination
With the flexibility of compartmental models, additional stages representing passive im-
munity, vaccination, hospitalization or quarantine can be introduced to the system to help
determine the best practice to achieve early containment. Since these stages are not natural
to the propagation of infectious diseases, special models are needed to analyze their effec-
tiveness and efficiency. Schuette and Hethcote used an age-structured model to study and
evaluate the effects of varicella vaccination programs [188]. Li and Ma studied an SIS epi-
demic model with vaccination, temporary immunity, and dynamical population size, and
identified three threshold parameters that determine the equilibrium of the system [148].
Arino et al. formulated a disease model that incorporate the movement of individuals over
spatial scales and discussed the influence of quarantine in the form of travel restriction
[14]. Arino et al. formulated compartmental models for influenza with control by vacci-
nation and antiviral treatment, and compared the analytical result with that of stochastic
simulations [13]. Liu et al. developed an SVIR structure to evaluate continuous vaccina-
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tion strategy and pulse vaccination strategy for vaccine doses that need to be taken several
times [152].
Besides modeling the effect of interventions on a large scale, the effects of internal dis-
ease propagation within hospitals, clinics, and point-of-dispensing sites (PODs) are also
studied. Liao et al. employed an SIR structure and a dynamic transmission model to
quantify the risk associated with indoor airborne infection [150]. Lee et al. analyzed the
propagation of highly infectious diseases within dispensing sites with large-scale simula-
tion [135]. The effect of prioritizing vaccine administration to the high-risk population
when the supply of vaccine is limited was studied by Lee et al. based on a combination of
compartmental models and a queueing model [143].
1.1.2 Stochastic Epidemiology Models
Stochastic models emphasize the randomness in the spread of infectious diseases and model
it as a stochastic process, or add stochastic components in the deterministic models. They
are preferred compared to deterministic models when analyses are possible since it is more
natural to depict the spread of disease as stochastic, and stochastic models are useful in pa-
rameter estimations and hypothesis testings [12]. In addition, simple deterministic models
may not be useful in understanding underlying principles of the spread of diseases in some
cases [113]. For complete reviews of stochastic epidemiology models, see Andersson and
Britton [12] and Britton [37].
Disease Models with Stochastic Process
The stochastic process approach was first developed by Russian physician P. D. En’ko.
He fitted a discrete chain binomial model for the spread of measles in St. Petersburg in
1889 [66]. This model was further developed and referred as Reed-Frost model in the
1920’s named after Lowell Reed and Wade Hampton Frost from Johns Hopkins University
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[1]. The Reed-Frost model describes the spread of infections in generations, and each
infectious individuals in generation t infects susceptible individuals independently with
probability p. Some asymptotic properties of the Reed-Frost model were studied by Sellke
[190] and Ball and O’Neill [19]. A similar approach is the Greenwood model proposed
in 1931 [103], which models the number of susceptible population St at generation t as a
binomial random variable that depends on both St−1 and a probability p: St ∼ B(St−1, p).
Markov chain is also widely used to model epidemiology. Under the closed population
assumption, there are finite number of states and each state represents a possible distribu-
tion of the susceptible and infectious populations. However, it was difficult to achieve an
analytical solution to this system [22]. Kendall provided an approximation to the Marko-
vian compartmental model and studied it analytically [122]. Other analytical results of
simpler Markov models in both discrete time and continuous time were developed and
studied [9, 165, 198]. Cooper and Lipsitch applied hidden Markov models to time series
to model hospital-acquired infections caused by transmissible pathogens [55]. Rao et al.
introduced state transitions in the Markov processes to model spatial interactions between
entities under an agent-based simulation framework [182].
Disease Models with Stochastic Differential Equations
Stochastic differential equations (SDE) were widely used to capture the randomness in
the spread of infectious diseases. One family of SDE models was developed based on
their deterministic counterparts by adding stochastic components. For example, based on
the Kermack–McKendrick framework, models with nonlinear disease propagation trend
[49, 83] and population with recruitment and deaths [116] were later developed. Allen
constructed a stochastic differential equation approximation to the continuous-time Markov
chain model in an SIS setting [7]. Stochastic diffusion model was also developed and
was shown as equivalent to a system of ordinary differential equations with time-variant
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coefficients [196].
Another method to introduce stochasticity to the deterministic models is parameter per-
turbation. The application of parameter perturbation in SIS models was discussed by Dalal
et al. [59] and Gray et al. [102]. Analytical properties such as conditions for stability
and asymptotic behaviors of the system on more complex compartmental models were also
studied. Chen and Li [48] and Tornatore et al. [197] investigated the stability of random
SIR models; Ding et al. studied the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic model specifically
for AIDS [67]; the properties of the stochastic SIRS model was studied by Lu [153].
Disease Models with Simulation or Network Structure
With the availability of computational power in recent decades, more complex stochastic
models for infectious diseases were studied. Simulation is widely used in studying the
complicated underlying mechanism in disease spread. Focks et al. developed a pair of
stochastic simulation models to study the epidemiology of dengue fever in the urban en-
vironment [89]. Smith et al. used individual-based stochastic simulation to predict the
development and evaluate interventions of malaria outbreaks [194]. Nakamura et al. stud-
ied the disease spreading with an agent-based simulation model analytically and enabled
the evaluation of stationary states in Markov processes [167]. The application of multi-
agent simulation in spatial epidemiology was explored by Ostfeld et al. [173] and Dion et
al. [68].
Monte Carlo simulation was also used to investigate epidemic events by treating it as
a non-equilibrium dynamic process, or fitting parameters for complex models. Hass et al.
described the disease spread in an SIR setting using global and local variables in Monte
Carlo simulation with different settings of square lattices [104]. The similar approach was
adapted by Karsten et al. to investigate the swine fever epidemics and their control [119].
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Aiello and da Silva used dynamical Monte Carlo methods to simulate Markov processes
based on a generalized SIRS model, and the performance of this approach agreed with
the 4th order Runge-Kutta Method for the deterministic model [4]. Markov Chain Monte
Carlo model was used in estimating epidemiological parameters of H1N1 influenza [200]
and deducting model parameters for stochastic compartmental models from incomplete
observations [96].
The network structure plays an important role in modeling the spread of diseases, as it
has better representations of the spatial distribution of infections. Bansal et al. used a net-
work perspective to relax the homogeneous-mixing assumption which is commonly used in
mathematical epidemiology models and evaluated several methods to incorporate contact
heterogeneity [20]. Theoretical analysis of epidemic spreading on heterogeneous networks
was studied, and the potential extensions towards coevolving, coupled, and time-varying
networks were discussed by Pastor-Satorras et al. [175]. May and Lloyd demonstrated
properties of infection processes on scale-free networks, and discussed the conditions of
achieving threshold behavior in such models [156]. Keeling and Eames described a series
of methods that allow the approximation and computation of mixing networks [121].
1.2 Modeling Framework for Contact-Based Diseases
In this section, we discuss the general-purpose modeling framework for contact-based dis-
eases. We first categorize the disease stages or compartments according to their roles and
properties in the spread of infectious diseases; then we define the essential variables for
the general-purpose model based on the categorization of stages; finally, we propose the
deterministic modeling framework for contact-based diseases.
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1.2.1 Categorization of Disease Stages
The general-purpose modeling framework for infectious diseases is developed based on the
compartmental models. Compartments, or disease stages, are the statuses that individuals
can fall into during the spread of infectious diseases. Assume that the human population is
homogeneous. Let Φ denote the collection of all possible stages. For example, for an SIR
model, Φ = {S, I, R}. Then any stage in Φ can be categorized in two different ways:
* Passive/Active stages. Individuals in a passive stage will not change their statuses
spontaneously. For instance, the susceptible stage is passive, as susceptible individ-
uals remain susceptible unless they make contact with the infectious population and
become infected. Let ΦP denote the collection of passive stages. On the contrary,
individuals in an active stage will change their statuses spontaneously. An example
of active stages is infectious: infectious individuals will either recover or decease
given sufficiently long time. Let ΦA denote the collection of active stages. Obvi-
ously, a stage is either passive or active. Therefore, ΦP ∪ ΦA = Φ. This method
categorization determines if a mean dwelling time is well defined for a stage.
* Vulnerable/Contagious/Unaffected stages. Individuals in a vulnerable stage can be
infected through contacting the infectious ones. Let ΦV denote the collection of
all vulnerable stages. Individuals in a contagious stage have the ability to infect
vulnerable entities. We use ΦC to denote all the contagious stages. The third category
is unaffected stages, in which individuals are neither vulnerable nor contagious, and
they are not in the system of infection. Denote them as ΦU . For example, after the
initial infection, entities will enter the exposed stage. They are not vulnerable, as they
have already been infected; but they are not infectious neither since the density of
viruses or bacteria has not reached the threshold to infect others. Another example of
the unaffected stage is the recovered stage in an SIR model with immunity assumed.
All natural stages without intervention will fall into one of these categories, thus
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ΦV ∪ ΦC ∪ ΦU = Φ.
Therefore, for each disease stage, it can be categorized using these two methods, and
these two ways of categorization capture the major characteristics of a disease stage. Take
the 4-stage SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) model as an example. Figure









Figure 1.1: Demonstration of stage categorization with an SEIR model.
In the SEIR setup, the passive/active stage categorization is
ΦP = {S,R},ΦA = {E, I}
and the vulnerable/contagious/unaffected stage categorization is
ΦV = {S},ΦC = {I},ΦU = {E,R}
1.2.2 Definition of Model Components
Contact-based diseases are transmitted via physical or indirect contacts between humans.
The main interest of compartmental model is to understand how the population associated
with each disease stage changes with respect to time t. Assume the total population in the
system is N at the beginning of an outbreak. Let φ(t) denote the number of individuals in
the corresponding compartment at time t, for all φ ∈ Φ. Then if we ignore the natural birth
and death of population, we have
∑
φ∈Φ φ(t) = N for any given t.
Define vector y = 〈φ(t)〉|φ∈Φ as the population in each compartment at time t. Simi-
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For all active stages, there is a well-defined average transition rate for each of them.
This transition rate represents how long an individual will stay in an active stage before
transiting to another stage. Therefore, for all φ ∈ ΦA, let µφ denote the mean transition rate
for stage φ; for φ ∈ ΦP , define µφ = 0 for completeness. Let µ = 〈µφ〉|φ∈Φ be the mean
transition rate for each stage.
To understand the destination of the disease transitions, define a disease transition ma-
trixD = 〈dab〉|a∈Φ,b∈Φ such that dab represents the disease transition probability from stage
b to stage a. The column sum of matrix D is either 0 or 1, where stages with column sum
equal to 0 are absorbing stages. Since the transition structure of an infectious disease is de-
termined by its own biological property, the disease transition matrix D can be viewed as
a constant parameter. Notice that new infections are also considered as disease transition.
For example, in the SEIR model discussed in Figure 1.1, the disease transition matrix is
D =

0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0

Let βφ denote the effective baseline infection rate or contact rate adjusted by the total
population in the system for all vulnerable stages φ ∈ ΦV . Again, define βφ = 0 for stages
φ ∈ φC ∪ φU for completeness. Use β = 〈βφ〉|φ∈Φ to denote the baseline contact rate
for every stage. Unlike the disease transition matrix D, the value of vector β may change
with respect to time t due to the change in the distribution of the population. An intuitive
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example is that people normally do not have contacts with the deceased population, thus
the deceased population needs to be excluded when calculating the population-adjusted
contact rate β.
In the previous section, we defined the relationship between vulnerable and contagious
stages: individuals in contagious stages can infect those in vulnerable stages via direct or
indirect contacts, depending on the biological property of the infectious disease. Here we
represent this relationship mathematically. For simplicity, we define a function S(φ) : Φ→
2Φ such that S(φ) gives the set of successor stages of φ in the disease transition diagram.
Since the transition structure can be fully characterized by the disease transition matrixD,
the function S(φ) can be expressed equivalently as
S(φ) = {ψ ∈ Φ : dψφ > 0} (1.1)
Similarly, we can define a function P(φ) : Φ → 2Φ such that P(φ) gives the set of
predecessor stages of φ. By using the definition of matrix D, the function P(φ) can be
expressed as
P(φ) = {ψ ∈ Φ : dφψ > 0} (1.2)
With function S properly defined, we can derive the disease contagious matrix C =
〈cab〉|a∈Φ,b∈Φ to represent the relationship between contagious and vulnerable stages. In
particular, cab = −1 if and only if a ∈ ΦV and b ∈ ΦC ; ckb = 1 for all k ∈ S(a) if and only
if a ∈ ΦV and b ∈ ΦC . For example, the disease contagious matrix for the SEIR model is
C =

0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

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Table 1.1 summarizes all the model components discussed in this section. These com-
ponents will be used to establish the general-purpose modeling framework.
Table 1.1: Definition of model components for modeling disease propagations.
Symbol Definition
y = 〈φ(t)〉|φ∈Φ Number of entities in each compartment at time t.
y′ = 〈φ′(t)〉|φ∈Φ The derivative of populations in each stage with respect to time t.
µ = 〈µφ〉|φ∈Φ Mean transition rate for active stages. Define µφ = 0 for passive
stages for completeness.
β = 〈βφ〉|φ∈Φ Baseline infection rate for vulnerable stages adjusted by total pop-
ulation. Define βφ = 0 for all φ 6∈ ΦV for completeness.
D = 〈dab〉|a∈Φ,b∈Φ Disease transition matrix: dab denotes the transition probability
from stage b to stage a; fully characterizes the transition diagram.
C = 〈cab〉|a∈Φ,b∈Φ Disease contagious matrix: if a ∈ ΦV and b ∈ ΦC , then cab = −1
and ckb = 1 for all successor stages k of a.
1.2.3 Modeling Framework for Contact-Based Diseases
With the model components defined in Table 1.1, we now derive the general-purpose mod-
eling framework for the spread of contact-based infectious diseases. In particular, we would
like to derive the expression for y′ using these modeling components, which gives us a con-
venient way to compute the population changes in each compartment within a time unit.
The changes in population can be decomposed into two parts: the changes due to the
natural progression of infectious diseases, and the changes due to new infections. For the
first part, the change of population in stage φ due to the natural development of itself can
be written as−µφφ(t). It can be rewritten more compactly in the matrix form: −diag(µ)y.
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This only considers the populations flowing out of the active stages. Since disease transition
matrix D captures the transition structure, it can be used to describe the destinations of
these population changes: the change of population in each stage due to the inflow caused
by the natural progression of active stages can be written as Ddiag(µ)y. By combining
the population changes in these two parts, the change of populations in each stage due to
the natural development of infectious disease can be written as:
y′development = (D − I)diag(µ)y (1.3)
The discussion above concludes the population change due to the natural development
of infectious diseases in the first part. For the second part, the cause of population changes
is new infections due to direct or indirect contacts between vulnerable and contagious indi-
viduals. The generation of new infections is determined by the populations of both vulner-
able and contagious stages. Consider a vulnerable individual in a vulnerable stage φ ∈ ΦV
who makes bφ contacts with others on average in a unit time. Assume the total popula-
tion that can be reached by this individual at time t is N(t), and C(t) out of these N(t)
individuals are contagious. Therefore, the average size of contagious population contacted
by this individual in a unit time is bφC(t)/N(t). Since the total size of population in the
vulnerable stage φ is φ(t), the total new infections introduced to the system in a unit time
from vulnerable stage φ is bφφ(t)C(t)/N(t). Since the baseline infection rate β defined in
Table 1.1 is already adjusted by the total population N(t), the size of new infections from
vulnerable stage φ can be written as βφφ(t)C(t).
Therefore, for a vulnerable stage φ ∈ ΦV , the changes of population due to new infec-
tions is −βφφ(t)
∑
ψ∈ΦC ψ(t). The infection structure between vulnerable and contagious
stages has already been captured by disease contagious matrix C, thus this change of pop-
ulation can be rewritten compactly in matrix form as diag(diag(β)y)Cy. Similarly, this
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equation only considers the outflow of population from vulnerable stages due to new infec-
tions. To capture the destinations of these flows, the disease transition matrix D is used.
The inflow in each stage due to new infection is then
diag(Ddiag(β)y)Cy (1.4)
Notice that this equation can be justified using Equation 1.1 and Equation 1.2: for a
vulnerable stage v ∈ ΦV that can be infected by individuals in stage u ∈ ΦC , cψv = 1 for





where eψ is the standard unit vector with the element corresponding to stage ψ being 1.














Notice that the column sum of disease transition matrix D is 1 for any vulnerable stage.




















which is the opposite of the summation of outflows in vulnerable stages. Therefore, the
validity of Equation 1.4 is justified.
By combining the population changes in these two parts, the change of population in
each stage due to the introduction of new infections in the system can be written as:
y′infection = diag((D + I)diag(β)y)Cy (1.7)
We have derived the equation to model the population change due to the natural pro-
gression of diseases in Equation 1.3 and the equation to describe the population change
due to new infections in Equation 1.7. By adding up these two equations, we obtain a
compact expression of y′, which concludes our general-purpose modeling framework for
contact-based diseases:
y′ = y′development + y
′
infection = (D − I)diag(µ)y + diag((D + I)diag(β)y)Cy (1.8)
Notice that this equation does not include natural born and death of the population. An
additional term λ(y) can be added to Equation 1.8 to describe the change of population in
each stage due to the natural born and death. Other factors that may cause the population
change can also be introduced to the current framework.
1.2.4 Model Stochasticity with Langevin Dynamics
Although the proposed modeling framework for contact-based infectious diseases de-
scribed in Equation 1.8 is deterministic, stochasticity can be introduced into this framework
to model the uncertainty in the spread of diseases. Langevin dynamics, first proposed
by French physicist Paul Langevin in 1908 [146], is a system of stochastic differential
equations with the stochastic terms accounting for omitted degrees of freedom. It was
originally used to model the dynamics of molecular systems in the field of statistic physics.
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This modeling technique is widely used to describe the evolution of the probabilities
associated to system dynamics with large population in each compartment in the study of
chemistry and epidemiology [52, 53, 97].
The idea of Langevin dynamics is to divide the variables in the system into two groups:
macroscopic variables change slowly and are responsible for the changes in mean values
of the system; microscopic variable changes faster with respect to time compared to the
macroscopic variables, and contribute to the stochastic part of the model. A generic form
of Langevin dynamics is
F (t) = y′(t) + η(t)
where y′(t) is the derivative of the macroscopic variable y with respect to time t, and η(t)
is a Gaussian noise. Usually, the magnitude of the Gaussian noise is proportional to the
square root of its macroscopic counterpart [94, 97]. Therefore, for a given stage φ in the
modeling framework for infectious diseases, the Langevin dynamics can be written as
φ(t) = φ′(t) +
√
φ′(t)η (1.9)
where η ∼ N (0, 1). Denote H(A) = A◦
1
2 as the Hadamard square root of nonnega-
tive matrix A, i.e., the (i, j) entry of H(A) is √aij . Then the general-purpose model
for contact-based infectious disease with Langevin dynamic can be derived directly from
Equation 1.8 and Equation 1.9:
y′ =(D − I)diag(µ)y + diag((D + I)diag(β)y)Cy
− (D − I)diag(ηD)H(diag(µ)y)−H(diag((D + I)diag(β)y))Cdiag(ηC)H(y)
where ηD and ηC are two statistically independent Gaussian random vectors with mean
0 and variance-covariance matrix I , representing the stochastic parts in the population
17
change in each stage corresponding to disease progression and new infections. Notice that
both matrices diag(µ)y and diag((D + I)diag(β)y) are nonnegative, thus the Hadamard
square root in the equation above is well-defined.
1.3 Modeling Framework for Vector-Borne Diseases
Vector-borne diseases are transmitted via different types of vectors and do not usually
transmit directly between humans. Examples of vector-borne diseases include dengue,
West Nile virus, yellow fever, and Zika virus. Corresponding compartmental models have
been developed and studied [61, 79–82, 84]. In this section, we develop a general-purpose
modeling framework for vector-borne infectious diseases and discuss some properties and
potential extensions and generalizations of this model.
1.3.1 Stages and Model Parameters for Human and Vector Populations
For simplicity, assume there are only two groups of populations in the system: human and
vector. Susceptible humans get infected through contact with infectious vectors, and in-
fectious human can infect susceptible vectors through contact as well. Assume an SEIR
structure for the human population, and an SID structure for the vector population, where
“D” stands for deceased. Figure 1.2 demonstrate a disease transition diagram for this set-
ting, where subscript H stands for the human stages, and subscript V stands for the vector
stages. The black solid arrows refer to the natural progression of diseases, and the red
dashed arrows refer to contacts between humans and vectors that cause infections.
Let ΦH denote the collection of all disease stages in the human population, and let ΦV
denote all stages in the vector population. Let yH and yV denote the population of each
compartment in both human and vector groups. The categorization of disease stages dis-
cussed in Section 1.2.1 still work with the separation of human and vector stages. Since the
symptoms and outcomes of infection are different between humans and vectors, all model
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Figure 1.2: Demonstration of stage transitions for a vector-borne disease.
parameters need to be distinguished by population groups. LetµH andµV denote the mean
transition rate for active stages in human population and vector population respectively, and
let µφ = 0 for passive stages in both human and vector population. Similarly, the disease
transition matrices for human and vector population are denoted asDH andDV .
Let βV→H and βH→V denote the baseline infection rates for human and vector popula-
tion due to the inter-species contacts adjusted by the total human population in the system.
Though the baseline contact rates between the two populations are the same, the probabil-
ities of getting infected may differ. Consider the scenario in which the overall contact rate
between two groups is b, and the probabilities of getting infectious from these contacts in
each disease stage is pH for human and pV for vector, then βV→H = bpH ,βH→V = bpV .
Besides the inter-species contacts, intra-species contacts may also introduce new infections
to the system, depending on the biological properties of the disease. Therefore, let βH→H
and βV→V be the baseline infection rate due to the contacts within the same population
group. These two parameters have the same interpretation as the baseline infection rate β
in the model for contact-based diseases.
Since the infection structure involves the interaction of two populations, there should
be two different disease contagious matrices, one for each direction of the infection. Let
CV→H = 〈cab〉|a∈ΦH ,b∈ΦV denote the disease contagious matrix for vectors infecting hu-
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mans, where cij = −1 if i ∈ ΦHV , j ∈ ΦVC , and ckj = 1 for all k ∈ S(i) if i ∈ ΦHV , j ∈ ΦVC .
Similarly, let CH→V = 〈cab〉|a∈ΦV ,b∈ΦH be the disease contagious matrix for humans in-
fecting vectors, where cij = −1 if i ∈ ΦVV , j ∈ ΦHC , and ckj = 1 for all k ∈ S(i) if
i ∈ ΦVV , j ∈ ΦHC . If infections within human or vector population group are possible, the
intra-group disease contagious matricesCH→H andCV→V can be defined in the same way
as in the model for contact-based diseases.
1.3.2 Modeling Framework for Vector-Borne Diseases
Similar to the modeling framework for contact-based diseases, the model for the vector-
borne disease can be separated into two parts: the population change in stages due to the
natural disease progression, and the population change due to new infections. Since the nat-
ural progression of diseases does not involve the interaction between humans and vectors,
this part can be written independently for both human and vector population:
y′H,development = (DH − I)diag(µH)yH ,y′V,development = (DV − I)diag(µV )yV
The change in populations due to new infections can be further split into two parts:
the intra-species infections and the inter-species infections. The approach to model intra-
species infections is the same as the model for contact-based diseases, as this change does
not involve the interactions between species:
y′H,intra-infection = diag((DH + I)diag(βH→H)yH)CH→HyH
y′V,intra-infection = diag((DV + I)diag(βV→V )yV )CV→V yV
To model the inter-species infections, assume the total human and vector populations
at time t are NH(t) and NV (t), respectively. Consider a vulnerable stage φ for the human
population. Since the baseline contact rate of vectors infecting humans adjusted by the
human population in stage φ is βV→H,φ, the number of infectious contacts a human make
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with the vector population in a unit time is βV→H,φNV (t). Among theNV (t) vectors, CV (t)
of them are contagious. Therefore, the exposure rate to infections for a single individual in
stage φ is βV→H,φCV (t).




ψ(t). Written more compactly with the disease conta-
gious matrixCV→H , the reductions of population in all human stages due to new infections
can be written as diag(diag(βV→H)yH)CV→HyV . Again, the destinations of the outflows
due to new infections are captured in the disease transition matrix for humanDH , thus the
inflows for all human stages can be written as diag(DHdiag(βV→H)yH)CV→HyV , fol-
lowing the same reasoning in the model for contact-based diseases. Therefore, the change
in populations in the human group due to inter-species infections is
y′H,inter-infection = diag((DH + I)diag(βV→H)yH)CV→HyV
Similarly, for a vulnerable stage φ in the vector population, the baseline contact rate
of humans infecting vectors in this stage adjusted by the human population is βH→V,φ
per unit time. Assume the total contagious human population at time t is CH(t). There-
fore, the exposure rate to infections for vectors in stage φ is βH→V,φCH(t). Then for the




ψ(t). Using the disease contagious matrix of human infecting
vectors CH→V , the reductions of populations in all vector stages due to new infections
is diag(diag(βH→V )yV )CH→V yH . With DV capturing the information of the destina-
tions of the outflows from stages due to new infections, the inflows for all vector stages is
diag(DV diag(βH→V )yV )CH→V yH . Summing up these two parts, the changes of popula-
tion in the vector group due to inter-species infections are:
y′V,inter-infection = diag((DV + I)diag(βH→V )yV )CH→V yH
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By adding up the changes in population due to disease progression, intra-species in-
fections and inter-species infections, the general-purpose modeling framework for vector-
borne diseases can be written as:
y′H = (DH − I)diag(µH)yH + diag((DH + I)diag(βH→H)yH)CH→HyH
+ diag((DH + I)diag(βV→H)yH)CV→HyV (1.10a)
y′V = (DV − I)diag(µV )yV + diag((DV + I)diag(βV→V )yV )CV→V yV
+ diag((DV + I)diag(βH→V )yV )CH→V yH (1.10b)
This modeling framework for vector-borne diseases can be further expanded to include
multiple species of vectors by introducing proper model parameters and interaction terms
between each combination of human and vector species. Additionally, the effect of alter-
native hosts for vector-borne diseases other than humans can also be introduced by adding
compartments corresponding to the alternative hosts population or use their populations to
adjust the baseline infection rate.
1.3.3 Modeling Dynamic Vector Population
In the previous models, the natural birth and death process of the human population was
not discussed in details, except for using a generic function λ(yH) to represent the natural
birth and death process. Since the length of an infectious disease outbreak is usually short
compared to the longevity of humans, the changes in human population due to reasons other
than infections can be safely ignored without drastically altering the results. However, since
the life cycles of common vectors (mosquitoes, fleas, etc.) are usually much shorter than
that of humans, their life cycles can play an essential role in determining the development
of disease outbreaks. Therefore, the definition of disease stages in the vector population
ΦV needs to be expanded to capture their life cycles.
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Take mosquitoes as an example. There are four different stages of the entire life cycle
of mosquitoes: eggs, larvae, pupae, and adults. Since the adult population has already been
considered in our previous modeling framework, three additional stages representing eggs,
larvae, and pupae should be introduced to ΦV . Mosquitoes in these stages do not contact
human directly, thus are not involved in the disease propagation, and we may assume they
belong to the unaffected stages ΦVU . On the other hand, although entities in these stages
will actively change their status and enter the next stage, they should not be categorized
to the active stages ΦVA , since the spontaneous change of stage is due to natural progres-
sion instead of disease propagation. For more general modeling purposes, the belonging
of infectious stages defined in previous sections needs to be determined according to the
biological properties of the vector being studied.
For stage φ belonging to additional stages representing the dynamic vector population,
if φ is active in terms of natural progression, there is a mean transition rate to other stages
τφ associated to it. Assume τ V = 〈τab〉|φ∈ΦV denote the mean transition rate for each
vector stages, while τφ = 0 if φ is not part of the stages representing natural population
progressions. Define a natural development matrixRV = 〈rab〉|a∈ΦV ,b∈ΦV such that rab = 1
if transition happens from stage b to stage a due to natural development, and rab = 0
otherwise. Again, the column sum of RV should be either 1 or 0, while 0 represents an
absorbing stage in the sense of natural progression without infections. Notice the difference
between RV and DV : RV represents the population change due to natural development,
which happens regardless of the existence of infections; DV represents the population
changes due to the development of infections and is well-defined if and only if an infectious
disease is spreading. Therefore, following the same reasoning in deriving the equations for
changes in populations due to the natural development of infections, the population changes
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due to the dynamics of vector life cycle can be written as:
y′V,progression = (RV − I)diag(τ V )yV
The second aspect in modeling the dynamic vector population is the reproduction pro-
cess. Let LV = 〈lab〉|a∈ΦV ,b∈ΦV denote the reproduction indicator matrix, where lab equals
the reproduction rate if from stage b to stage a, i.e., vectors in stage b will give birth to
new vector populations belonging to stage a at rate lab. Define lab = 0 if the reproduction
process does not happen between stage b to stage a. Since the reproduction process only
increases the vector population and does not impact the existing population, the population
changes due to due to reproduction in the natural dynamics of vector population can be
written as
y′V,reproduction = LV yV
Combining the two aspects of changes in vector population due to natural development
and reproduction, the dynamic vector population can be modeled as
y′V,dynamic = ((RV − I)diag(τ V ) +LV )yV
and this term can be added to Equation 1.10b and provide a more detailed description of
the vector population dynamics throughout an infectious disease outbreak.
1.4 Basic Reproduction Number
The basic reproduction numberR0, defined as the average number of secondary infections
caused by one infectious individual in a system consists of only susceptible population,
is one of the major concepts in the research of epidemiology models. It is a measure of
the potential for disease spread, as well as a threshold for the stability of a disease-free
equilibrium of the ODE system [63]. If R0 < 1, the number of new infections introduced
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to the system will fail to replace themselves, and the outbreak will start to contain; if
R0 > 1, then the infectious population will increase and the disease will spread.
Castillo-Chavez et al. [45], Van den Driessche and Watmough [71, 72] and Diekmann
et al. [64] used the approach of next generation matrix at equilibrium to define the basic
reproduction numberR0. Following this method, we derive the basic reproduction number
for our general-purpose modeling framework in Equation 1.8. First, assume the system
has a disease-free equilibrium y∞ such that φ(∞) = 0 for all φ ∈ ΦA, i.e., there is no
population in active stages, thus no new infections will be introduced to the system spon-
taneously. Assume new infections are introduced to the system at this equilibrium, and the
populations in all passive stages are treated as constants for simplicity. Therefore, we may
only consider the population changes in active stages. Let yA denote the partial population
vector with only active stages of vector y. LetA = 〈aφψ〉|φ∈ΦA,ψ∈Φ be a |ΦA| × |Φ| matrix
such that aφφ = 1 if and only if φ ∈ ΦA, while all other elements are 0. For any |Φ| × |Φ|
matrix B, ABAᵀ gives a sub-matrix of B which consists only rows and columns in ΦA.
Following Equation 1.8, the population changes in active stages after introducing a new
infection at the equilibrium y∞ is
y′A = A(D − I)diag(µ)AᵀyA +Adiag((D + I)diag(β)y∞)CAᵀyA (1.11)
Following the notation in [71] and [72], denote
V = −A(D − I)diag(µ)Aᵀ,F = Adiag((D + I)diag(β)y∞)CAᵀ
then Equation 1.11 can now be written as y′A = (F − V )yA. The number of infections
produced by the new infectious individual is the product of the expected duration of this
individual staying infectious and the rate of introducing new infections. The rate of intro-
ducing new infections is already captured in matrix F . To calculate the expected duration
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of staying infectious, consider the following system which only involves disease progres-
sion with a specified initial value y0 without new infections:
y′A = −V yA,yA(0) = y0
The solution of this system is h(t,y0) = e−V ty0, where each component in this solution
can be interpreted as the probability that the infectious individual represented by y0 is in
the corresponding disease stage when introduced to the system at time t = 0. Therefore,






e−V tdty0 = FV
−1y0
The matrix K = FV −1 is called next generation matrix for the system at the disease-free
equilibrium y∞. The (φ, ψ) entry of matrix K is the expected number of new infections
in stage φ produced by infectious individuals initially in stage ψ. Van den Driessche and
Watmough showed thatK has nonnegative eigenvalues, and the basic reproduction number
of the system is defined as R0 = ρ(K), where ρ(K) denote the spectral radius of matrix
K, which is the maximum of the moduli of the eigenvalues of K. The eigenvector ω
associated withR0 is also shown to be nonnegative [71, 72].
The idea behind this definition of R0 originates from the asymptotic behavior of the
system. Assume after m generations after the initial introduction of infection individual
y0, the magnitude of infectious population is ||Kmy0||1, and the per-generation growth
factor is ||Km||1/m1 . Let m→∞, then limm→∞ ||Km||
1/m
1 = ρ(K) by Gelfand’s formula.
Therefore, the average number of secondary infections, in the long run, is given by ρ(K),
which defines the basic reproduction number in the previous discussion. See Diekmann et
al. [64] for more details. An interpretation of this definition of basic reproduction number
is that if the distribution of the infectious individual introduced at the equilibrium follows
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the eigenvector ω of the matrix K that corresponds to eigenvalue R0, then the maximal
number of typical secondary infections produced by the initial infection will beR0.
Notice that calculating the basic reproduction number with next generation matrix re-
quires prior knowledge on the disease-free equilibrium y∞. Such equilibrium may not be
obtained analytically in many scenarios. In that case, numerical approaches are needed to
compute the basic reproduction number. Take the SEIR model described in Figure 1.1 as
an example and calculate its basic reproduction number. Since no closed-form disease-free
equilibrium can be obtained for an arbitrary distribution of initial population, assume this















the basic reproduction number of this system at equilibrium is









The basic reproduction number for vector-borne disease can be defined similarly. Con-
sider the vector-borne disease described in Figure 1.2. Assume the disease-free equilibrium





V , 0, D
∗
V )
ᵀ, and assume the model pa-
rameters for this system are
βV→H = (β, 0, 0, 0)
ᵀ,βH→V = (β, 0, 0)
ᵀ,µH = (0, µE, µI , 0)
ᵀ,µV = (0, µV , 0)
ᵀ
Consider only the active stages in both human and vector populations, and arrange them
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Then the basic reproduction number of this system is
























In this section, we discuss two applications of our proposed general-purpose modeling
framework in modeling the spread of Zika virus and avian influenza virus and demonstrate
how the proposed models can assist in the effort of containing infectious disease outbreaks.
1.5.1 Modeling Zika Virus Outbreaks with Dynamic Human and Vector Populations
The Zika virus (ZIKV) outbreak in South American countries and its potential association
with microcephaly in newborns and Guillain-Barré Syndrome led the World Health Orga-
nization to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. To understand the
ZIKV disease dynamics and evaluate the effectiveness of different containment strategies,
we propose a compartmental model with a vector-host structure for ZIKV. The model uti-
lizes logistic growth in human population and dynamic growth in vector population. Using
this model, we derive the basic reproduction number to gain insight on containment strate-
gies. We contrast the impact and influence of different parameters on the virus trend and
outbreak spread. We also evaluate different containment strategies and their combination
effects to achieve early containment by minimizing total infections. This result can help
decision makers select and invest in the strategies most effective to combat the infection
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spread. The decision-support tool demonstrates the importance of “digital disease surveil-
lance” in response to waves of epidemics including ZIKV, Dengue, Ebola, and cholera.
This section is adapted from the paper appeared in American Medical Informatics Associ-
ation Proceedings 2016 [137].
Introduction
Zika virus (ZIKV) is an arbovirus belonging to the family Flaviviridae and is closely related
to the dengue, yellow fever, Japanese encephalitis, and West Nile viruses. It was first
isolated from a monkey in the Zika forest of Uganda in 1947; the second isolation was
made from Aedes africanus mosquitoes in the same forest in 1948 [62]. Although earlier
studies have suggested the possibility of human infection [193], before 2007, ZIKV rarely
caused recognized “spillover” infections in humans, even in highly enzootic areas. In 2007,
the first documented ZIKV outbreak was reported from Yap State, Federated States of
Micronesia [73]. French Polynesia also reported an outbreak of 28,000 estimated cases in
2013 [40]. Since April 2015, Brazil has been experiencing a ZIKV outbreak. The outbreak
has subsequently spread to other countries in South America, Central America, and the
Caribbean [38, 39, 108].
ZIKV is primarily transmitted by the bites of infectious Aedes mosquitoes, especially
Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus [100]. Non-vector borne transmissions, though rare,
have also been reported [90]. Symptoms of ZIKV infection include fever, rash, conjunc-
tivitis, and retro-orbital pain. These symptoms are usually mild and unspecific [112]. The
ZIKV infection is difficult to detect since its symptoms are similar to those of dengue and
chikungunya [100]; asymptotic cases are also frequent, which makes it even harder to pre-
cisely diagnose the ZIKV infection [105]. Although the symptoms of ZIKV infections are
usually mild and unlethal, it has recently been connected to microcephaly in infants born
to mothers infected with ZIKV during pregnancy, suggesting the possibility of intrauterine
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infection [204]. ZIKV is also suspected to be linked to Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS)
[172], a muscle weakness caused by the immune system damaging the peripheral nervous
system.
With the ease of modern transportation, there is a potential that the ZIKV outbreak may
become a global public health crisis [30]. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the trans-
mission dynamics of ZIKV and establish a set of strategies that help to contain the outbreak
effectively. Mathematical models have long been used to analyze infectious disease out-
breaks to facilitate the development of policies and strategies for understanding disease
propagation and containment strategies [101]. Since ZIKV is closely related to West Nile,
dengue, and yellow fever viruses [130], it can be modeled with similar techniques. Be-
cause of dengue’s global impact, its disease dynamics have been studied extensively, and
compartmental models based on Susceptible, Infectious, Recovered (SIR), and Suscepti-
ble, Exposed, Infectious, Recovered (SEIR) hosts have been proposed and analyzed [61,
79–82, 84]. The population dynamics and life table of the major vector of ZIKV, Aedes
mosquitoes, are also well studied [57, 78, 195, 203], and can be incorporated in the com-
partments for vectors.
In this study, we present a compartmental model for ZIKV based on SEIR host model
and SEI vector model, using logistic growth in human population and dynamic vector pop-
ulation. We conduct sensitivity analysis on multiple parameters to understand the risk and
transmission of ZIKV and evaluate the efficiency of different containment strategies. We
discuss how this may assist in decision making to control and mitigate outbreaks.
Methods and Designs
Following the notation in the general-purpose model, the model for Zika virus consists of
two parts: the compartments for human, subscripted withH; and the compartments for vec-
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tors, subscripted with V . Although there have been a few reported deaths related to ZIKV,
most ZIKV cases only result in mild symptoms among infectious individuals. We use an
SEIR (Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Recovered) model to describe the disease spread
among the human population, denoted as SH(t), EH(t), IH(t), andRH(t) respectively. The
total human population at time t is given as NH(t) = SH(t) + EH(t) + IH(t) + RH(t).
During the outbreak, the human population is assumed to follow a logistic growth with
equal birth and death rates λ and carrying capacity KH .
The compartments for vectors consist of both the infectious status and the life stages of
the mosquitoes. A typical life cycle of a mosquito has four stages: egg, larva, pupa, and
adult. Let V1(t), V2(t) and V3(t) denote the number of eggs, larvae, and pupae of vectors
in the environment. Since only female adults bite humans and transmit the virus, there are
no infectious compartments for these three stages. Let SV (t), EV (t) and IV (t) denote the
number of susceptible, exposed, and infectious female adults in the environment at time t,
and denote the total female vector population as NV (t) = SV (t) + EV (t) + IV (t). Due to
their short life cycle, the deceased stage of vector population is also considered; however,
we do not include it in the analysis explicitly for simplicity. The transmission from suscep-
tible to infectious in both human and vector population is associated with mosquito bites.
Figure 1.3 shows the transition diagram.
SH EH IH RH
IV EV SV V3 V2 V1
Figure 1.3: Zika: transition diagram of the compartmental model.
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Let b denote the average biting rate per unit time of a female mosquito; b typically
ranges from 0.3 to 0.5 per day [78]. Let β represent the percentage of bites that trans-
mit ZIKV. In addition, let M denote the number of alternative hosts besides human in
the environment. Therefore, following the same reasoning in deriving the general-purpose
modeling framework for vector-borne disease, the exposure rate of a human to infection is
βbIV /(NH+M), and the exposure rate of a mosquito for infection is βbIH/(NH+M). As-
sume the inverse incubation time of ZIKV for the human is αH , and the recovery rate of an
infectious individual is γ. Using the rule of logistic growth, the natural human population
growth rate is λ, and the decreasing human population due to limited carrying capacity is
λN2H/KH . This amount is distributed in the four compartments according to their relevant
sizes. Plugging these parameters into Equation 1.10, the transitions between compartments



























RH = γIH − λNH
RH
KH
For the vector compartments, let eV denote the number of eggs laid per female mosquito
per unit time, and αV be the inverse incubation time of ZIKV in vectors. Let τi and µi be
the reciprocal of the development time and mortality rate of vectors in stage i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
respectively. In addition, let µV denote the mortality rate of female adults. Assume q is the
percentage of females among all adult vectors. Since mosquito larvae live in water with
limited resources, the dynamics of the larvae population is also assumed to follow a logistic
growth with environmental carrying capacity KV . The mortality rate of larvae caused by
limited carrying capacity is denoted as κ. Plugging these parameters into Equation 1.10,





V1 = eVNV − (τ1 + µ1)V1
d
dt





V2 = τ2V2 − (τ3 + µ3)V3
d
dt
SV = qτ3V3 −
βbIH
NH +M






SV − (µV + αV )EV
d
dt
IV = αVEV − µV IV
Refer to Appendix in this section to see the model matrices used for this case in Equa-
tion 1.10 to derive the systems of ordinary differential equations above. Table 1.2 summa-
rizes the values of model parameters and their literature sources.
Table 1.2: Zika: parameter values in modeling the disease dynamics.
Name Notation Value Literature Source
Number of infectious bites
delivered per vector per day βb 0.05− 0.12 [78, 203]
Incubation time in human 1/αH 2− 4 days [24]
Incubation time in vector 1/αV 8− 12 days [108]
Recovery time in human 1/γ 5− 7 days [46]
Number of eggs laid
per female mosquito per unit time eV 80/day [57, 78]
Egg development time 1/τ1 3 days [78, 195]
Egg mortality rate µ1 0.05 [78, 195]
Larvae development time 1/τ2 9 days [78, 195]
Larva mortality rate µ2 0.025 [78, 195]
Pupa development time 1/τ3 3 days [78]
Pupa mortality rate µ3 0.0025 [78]
Adult mortality rate µV 0.05 [78, 195]
Female adult percentage q 0.68 [195]
The system of ordinary differential equations above has a disease-free equilibrium if
eV qτ1τ2τ3 > (τ1 + µ1)(τ2 + µ2)(τ3 + µ3)µV
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evqτ1τ2τ3 − (τ1 + µ1)(τ2 + µ2)(τ3 + µ3)µV
(τ1 + µ1)(τ3 + µ3)2µ2V κ
KV qτ2τ3







If we arrange the compartments corresponding to infectious stages as {EH , IH , EV , IV },
following the notation in deriving the formula for basic reproduction number, the compo-























0 0 µV + αV 0
0 0 −αV µV

Therefore, the basic reproduction number for our model is the spectral radius of the next
generation matrix FV −1:







(αH + λ)(γ + λ)(αV + µV )µV
To quickly contain the outbreak and reach a disease-free equilibrium, it is desirable to
reduce the basic reproduction number such thatR0 < 1. In that case, an infected individual
produces less than one new infected individual during its infectious period and the outbreak
will start to contain. Using the formula for R0, we may alter the model parameters by
introducing interventions to contain the outbreak. In particular, the following two strategies
are considered:
1. Reduce biting rate b by avoiding mosquito bites, using insect repellents, wearing
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long-sleeved clothes and long pants, and using air conditioning and window/door
screens to keep mosquitoes outside.
2. Reduce adult female vector population or increase adult female vector mortality rate
µV at equilibrium by widely applying insecticides in areas with high (infectious)
mosquito population, or introducing genetically modified Aedes mosquitoes, which
will cause its offspring to die by reducing larval survival rate and adult longevity [21,
44].
To validate the performance of the model and investigate the effectiveness of contain-
ment strategies, we perform sensitivity and scenario analysis using the 2015 ZIKV data.
For sensitivity analysis, we vary the recovery time (γ) and the incubation time of human
(αH). For containment strategies, we experiment with biting rate (b), adult vector mortality
rate (µV ), carrying capacity of larvae (KV ), and adult vector population (NV ). We report
the estimated number of infections and time to reach containment. The simulation is per-
formed until an asymptotic behavior is achieved. This signals containment is reached – the
cumulative number of infections plateaus.
Results
Table 1.3 summarizes the parameters used in modeling the Zika disease dynamics for Rio
de Janeiro State (Sentinel surveillance sites reports [33]) and for a hypothetic town with
100,000 people. Between January 2015 to July 2015, a total of 364 suspected cases were
reported in Rio de Janeiro State. By November, the outbreak was contained with approxi-
mately 440 infection cases.
Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil Figure 1.4 contrasts the reported cases versus simulation
by varying the recovery time (γ) and the incubation time of human (αH). The results
suggest that Table 1.3 provides good estimates for the reported cases (green solid curve vs
red dotted curve). When the recovery time increases from 6 to 8 days (dotted vs dashed
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Table 1.3: Zika: estimated parameter values used in the simulations.
Name Notation Rio de Janeiro State A town of 100,000
Initial human population NH(0) 16,231,365 100,000
Initial human infections IH(0) 1 10
Initial adult vector population NV (0) 70,000,000 500,000
Initial exposed adult vectors EV (0) 5 1,000
Initial infectious adult vectors IV (0) 5 1,000
Initial number of eggs V1(0) 180,000,000 500,000
Initial number of larvae V2(0) 90,000,000 150,000
Initial number of pupae V3(0) 70,000,000 100,000
Infectious daily biting rate βb 0.071 0.09
Carrying capacity for human KH 30,000,000 120,000
Carrying capacity for larvae KV 100,000,000 5,000,000
Larvae mortality rate due to
limited carrying capacity κ 1 1
Number of alternative hosts M 100,000 80,000
Human population growth rate λ 0.00005 0.00005
Recovery time of human 1/γ 7 days 7 days
Incubation time of human 1/αH 3 days 3 days
Incubation time of vector 1/αV 10 days 10 days
Basic reproduction number
(estimate from parameters) R0 1.1139 1.109
Simulation start date Jan 1, 2015 Day 0
Implementation of strategies May 1, 2015 Day 100
Time for containment
without intervention Nov, 2015 Day 900
green curves), the cumulative infections increases from 340 to 566 by July 2015 (66.5%
increase). Longer recovery time also leads to delayed containment. This confirms that
recovery time has a significant impact on disease containment. Thus timely treatment and
vaccination for combating ZIKV are critical. Varying the human incubation period from 2
days to 4 days has a relatively minor influence on the overall infections (from 427 to 459,
7.5% increase) and the outbreak trend (contrast the three solid lines).
Figure 1.5 contrasts containment effectiveness for four strategies: reducing biting rate

























Recovery Time = 6 days, Incubation Time = 3 days
Recovery Time = 7 days, Incubation Time = 3 days
Recovery Time = 8 days, Incubation Time = 3 days
Recovery Time = 7 days, Incubation Time = 2 days
Recovery Time = 7 days, Incubation Time = 4 days
Figure 1.4: Zika: sensitivity analysis for Rio de Janeiro State.
and reducing adult female vector population (NV ). Without these strategies, total infec-
tion reaches 443 and will be contained by October 2015. In our analysis, we assume each
strategy is implemented on May 1, 2015. Figure 1.5(a) shows that reducing biting rate by
a mere 20% will lead to an early containment by August 2015 (90 days after implementa-
tion) with 270 total infections (39% reduction). The containment is achieved rapidly (¡ 60
days after implementation) with total infection under 200 when biting rate is reduced by
at least 40%. This proves that reducing biting rate is highly effective. This strategy is also
relatively easy to implement. Increasing the mortality rate of adult vectors is also effective.
Figure 1.5(b) shows that increasing the vector mortality rate by 20% will lead to an August
containment with total infection of 282 (36% reduction). Containment will be achieved
instantly with no more than 220 infections if the mortality rate is increased by at least 40%.
While this strategy can be achieved by introducing genetically modified mosquitoes to the
environment, it is difficult to realize and economically inferior when compared to other
strategies.
The larvae carrying capacity has to be reduced by 80% in order for total infection
to reduce to 330 (26% reduction) with containment achieved by October (Figure 1.5(c)).
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(b) Increase adult vector mortality rate 
 
(c) Reduce larvae carrying capacity 
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Reduce Vector Population by 40%
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Figure 1.5: Zika: contrast of outbreak trends for four strategies in Rio de Janeiro State.
Nonetheless, examining and clearing the water ponds and humid areas where the larvae
live remains an important strategy for public health protection. Reducing vector population
not only affects the number of infections at containment, it also changes the trend of the
outbreak (Figure 1.5(d)). Specifically, reducing total adult vector population by 20% would
postpone the outbreak by a month and reduce total infection to 334. Containment can
be rapid when the reduction is targeted at 80% (total infection reduces to 130). Figures
1.5(c) and 1.5(d) highlight that reducing adult population is more effective, though applying
insecticide widely may come with numerous environmental and health issues.
In practice, combination strategies are often most effective. For brevity, Figure 1.6 re-
ports containment results for the combination of two strategies. In both figures, the vertical
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axis represents the cumulative number of human infections at containment. When 40%
reduction is achieved in both biting rate and larvae carrying capacity; it results in 180 total
infections (Figure Figure 1.6(a)). Similarly, the combination of reducing vector population











































































Figure 1.6: Zika: infections with combinations of 2 strategies in Rio de Janeiro State.
Figure 1.7 shows the containment results for the combination of three strategies, where
the color of each grid represents the cumulative human infections at equilibrium. For ex-
ample, if increasing vector mortality rate, reducing biting rate, and reducing adult vector
population are all carried out at 10% level, the total infections will be 250 (Figure 1.7(a)).
Since it can be difficult to achieve high effectiveness using a single strategy, combination
strategies are appealing. Our results also display marginal improvement beyond certain
threshold values in the strategies. This helps policymakers to invest their resources opti-
mally for best possible gain.
A hypothetic town with 100,000 people To better understand the behavior and sen-
sitivity of our model and the disease spread characteristics, we perform the analysis on a



















































































Figure 1.7: Zika: infections with combinations of 3 strategies in Rio de Janeiro State.
vention, containment will occur at Day 900 with 42,000 overall infections. We observe
some similarities as in the Rio de Janeiro State analysis. An increase in human recovery
time delays the containment and increases the total number of infections (Figure 1.8(a)).
Similarly, the incubation period for humans has little effect on the overall disease trend
(Figure 1.8(c)). On the other hand, the incubation time for the vectors significantly affects
the overall number of infections while exhibiting the same outbreak pattern (Figure 1.8(d)).
We explore alternative hosts and their impact on the pandemic. Increasing the number of
alternative hosts from 20,000 to 100,000 (Figure 1.8(b)) will slow the outbreak and reduce
the total number of infections by 83.3%. This suggests that introducing alternative hosts
has potential in mitigating an outbreak. However, it is possible that these hosts can get
infected with ZIKV and spread it to humans via other means. The ecological and disease
impact cannot be fully assessed at this point, thus rendering it an unsafe venue for ZIKV
disease containment.
We assume each strategy is implemented on Day 100 after the outbreak. Figure 1.9
reports containment effectiveness for each strategy. Reducing bite rate by 20% (Figure
1.9(a)) and increasing vector mortality by 20% (Figure 1.9(b)) have similar effectiveness in
containing the disease spread (Day 500 vs Day 300) and with comparable overall infection
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Vector Incubation Time = 8 days
Vector Incubation Time = 9 days
Vector Incubation Time = 10 days
Vector Incubation Time = 11 days
Vector Incubation Time = 12 days
Figure 1.8: Zika: sensitivity analysis for the hypothetic town.
Reducing larvae carrying capacity has a significant impact on the outbreak (Figure 1.9(c)).
In particular, over 40% reduction in infection is observed when 20% reduction in carry-
ing capacity is in effect. On the other hand, reducing vector population is not as effective
in containing the ZIKV outbreak (Figure 1.9(d)). Nonetheless, reducing vector population
does influence the pandemic course: when the vector population is reduced by 20%, it post-
pones the onset of the outbreak by approximately 100 days and reduces the total infection
by 9.5%. These results are different from the findings in the Rio de Janeiro State analysis
where reducing the carrying capacity of larvae proves to be not very effective. Similarly,
combination strategies can be used in this scenario to achieve better containment results.
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Figure 1.9: Zika: contrast outbreak trends for four strategies in the hypothetic town.
Discussion
This work demonstrates the key importance of “digital disease surveillance” in response to
waves of epidemics including ZIKV, Dengue, Ebola, and cholera. Specifically, we develop
a compartmental model with a vector-host structure utilizing logistic growth for human
population and a dynamic vector population describing its full life cycle. We analyze the
development of ZIKV outbreak and explore key parameters that influence epidemic sever-
ity. We study the effect of average recovery time (of human) from infection, the number of
alternative hosts, and the ZIKV incubation time in both vectors and humans. The analyses
are performed on two populations with real data from Rio de Janeiro State. Our results
reveal that the outbreak is sensitive to the first three parameters while human incubation
period has only a marginal impact.
42
We examine four containment strategies: reducing biting rate, increasing vector mortal-
ity rate, reducing larvae carrying capacity, and reducing vector population. All four strate-
gies are effective (in varying degrees) in containing the outbreak and reducing the overall
infection. While findings for reducing biting rate and increasing vector mortality rate are
similar for both populations (both are superior to other strategies), results for the larvae
carrying capacity and reduction in vector population differ. These findings suggest envi-
ronmental and demographic information should be considered when determining proper
containment strategies. Our study also shows that reducing vector population early on can
help delay the onset of the outbreak.
Combination strategies are both promising in practice and cost-effective in achieving
early containment. The model provides a decision support framework for policymakers
to estimate the cost-effectiveness for each prevention measure. Public health departments
should select a strategy portfolio compatible with their local environment and regional
demographics. In addition, the public should be educated and informed of ZIKV status.
Population behaviors (protecting themselves by reducing biting, cleaning water ponds to
rid of larvae, etc.) have a demonstrably significant impact on containing and mitigating the
outbreak.
The multiple components involving the dynamics of human and vector populations in
this model allow flexibility in characterizing disease spread and performing strategic anal-
ysis. However, obtaining/determining all essential input parameters for this to be practical
may prove difficult. The model can be simplified without diminishing its quality and rigor
in disease dynamics and infection/containment outcome prediction. Such a model may be
desirable when detailed input data are not readily available. For example, the natural hu-
man population can be assumed to be constant throughout the outbreak since the magnitude
of natural population growth is relatively small within the pandemic period. The mosquito
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population life-cycle can also be condensed to a simple birth-death process. we propose
a simplified model with constant human and mosquito population to study the ZIKV out-
break. The study predicts the disease trends and characterizes containment strategies for
Brazil and Puerto Rico. The model has accurately predicted ZIKV outbreak trends for these
two countries. It predicts the number of infectious pregnant women in Puerto Rico within
5% of the actual documented numbers (as of July 2016). Although the simplified model
is statistically useful and usable, additional components and parameters presented herein
should help decision-makers better understand the details of ZIKV outbreaks. It may also
provide them with more analytic-based options in deciding the proper containment strate-
gies when such input data are available.
Modern information technologies which are capable of tracking disease spread and vec-
tor activities play an indispensable role in supporting disease modeling and in mitigating
and containing epidemiology outbreaks. Informatics applications such as social media and
internet-based participatory surveillance systems have already demonstrated their capabil-
ity in helping us understand and prevent disease outbreaks like Dengue and influenza [154,
211]. Software and hardware such as ArcGIS platform and mobile DNA sequencing lab
are also designed to help track the current ZIKV outbreak. These technologies capture
valuable inputs for our model, which is very flexible and can be easily adapted in real-time
as real data feeds arrive. With the support of these technologies, the model parameters can
be estimated accurately and updated on a regular basis. The model output can then be used
to predict the status of the outbreak in a timely manner. It also reflects any changes in the
environment, policy, and human and social behavior. Conversely, the model can also serve
as a guideline for the application of these decision technologies such that they are deployed
and utilized optimally by policymakers. Informatics can help us understand the underlying
mechanism of the pandemic spread. It also enables decision-makers and policymakers to
understand/update the planning and response strategy in real time to maximize the contain-
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ment effect while minimizing the overall infection/mortality and the associated costs and
health burden.
There are limitations to our study. We assume a homogeneous human population in the
model, which may not hold in practice. The possibility of contacting mosquitoes and the
chance of getting infected from an infectious vector may differ among individuals and the
environment. This can be overcome by creating additional compartments for each homoge-
neous subgroup. We have incorporated this subgroup concept in our vaccine prioritization
analysis with great success [143]. However, this requires even more parameter estimation
and may lead to over-fitting. In addition, our conclusions are strongly influenced by results
from a particular demographic and geographic profile. Local decision makers should input
proper (best estimate) parameters into the model in order to conduct accurate analyses.
The current model does not include treatment or vaccination effects since they are cur-
rently under developed. With a deeper understanding of ZIKV and the presence of medi-
cations and vaccines, these factors can be incorporated under our modeling framework.
Appendix
Following the notations in our general-purpose modeling framework for vector-borne dis-
eases, if we align the order of human compartments as SH , EH , IH , RH and align the order
of vector compartments as V1, V2, V3, SV , EV , IV , DV , the model matrices for the human
and vector populations are
DH =

0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
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Plugging the model matrices above into the modeling framework presented in Equation
1.10 results in the system of ordinary differential equations used in the model for Zika virus
outbreak.
1.5.2 Modeling Avian Influenza Outbreaks with Migration and Transportation
Avian influenza viruses have caused infections and deaths in wild birds, commercial poul-
tries, and humans. It poses an increasing threat of a pandemic. To understand the transmis-
sion dynamics of avian influenza viruses and assess the effectiveness of different contain-
ment strategies, we develop a flexible modeling framework based on multi-layer compart-
mental models for digital disease surveillance and response in combating pandemics. The
model can accommodate other disease outbreaks under diverse settings. We demonstrate its
usage on avian influenza and derive the basic reproduction number and spread characteris-
tics. We contrast the effectiveness of different containment strategies and their combination
effect in protecting both the human and the bird population. This section is adapted from
the paper appeared in American Medical Informatics Association Proceedings 2017.
Introduction
Avian influenza is caused by infection with avian influenza Type A viruses. These viruses
were first isolated from common terns in South Africa [25] and was later extensively stud-
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ied. They occur naturally among wild birds and can infect domestic poultry and other
animal species, including cats and swine. The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI),
the very virulent types of avian influenza Type A viruses (majorly subtypes H5 and H7), can
cause almost 100% death for birds [5]. They do not normally infect humans, but sporadic
human infections with avian flu viruses have been reported, with approximate 50% mortal-
ity rate [126]. There is no clinical evidence that avian influenza can be directly transmitted
between humans, but such possibility remains through mutant avian influenza viruses and
should be closely monitored to reduce the infections and mortalities among humans [191,
214].
Primary outbreaks of HPAI in poultry have been reported multiple times. The more
recent outbreaks started in 2003 when multiple avian influenza cases in wild birds, domestic
poultry, and humans were reported worldwide. The H5N1 influenza outbreak in Southeast
Asia in 2003 infected more than 130 people in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia and killed
more than half of them [207]. The same subtype appeared in wild birds and domestic
poultry in China afterwards, causing human infections as well [128]. It was estimated
that by 2005, this outbreak had caused more than $10 billion in losses to the Southeast
Asian poultry industry [23]. Large outbreaks in commercial poultry farms in industrialized
countries in Europe and the United States have also been reported [93], indicating that
avian influenza is not only a threat to human health, it also jeopardizes the poultry industry
and has a significant impact on the economy. Predicting the trend of an avian influenza
outbreak and implementing an optimal intervention strategy to achieve early containment is
crucial. Pandemic planning and large-scale surveillance are essential in promoting effective
responses [58]; with real-time analysis of surveillance data being critically important to
detect and predict an outbreak in a timely manner.
Numerous mathematical models have been developed to describe the spread of an epi-
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demic to facilitate decision making using surveillance data. During the past two decades,
various models were proposed for general influenza and avian influenza. A probability-
based quantitative analysis was used to estimate the risk of an emerging pandemic strain
of avian influenza [86]. Agent-based simulation of individual and community activities
was developed to prevent and control influenza pandemics [43]. Stochastic models were
developed to predict the worldwide spread of pandemic influenza based on global travel
information [52]. Compartmental models remain a popular method for pandemic studies.
Ordinary differential equation-based methods were used to interpret the mutation process
of avian influenza [115], model the dynamics of human infections [61], and investigate
nonlocal epidemics [3].
In this section, we use the general-purpose disease modeling framework for vector-
borne diseases to model the spread of avian influenza virus. We use the avian influenza
outbreak data from Egypt and United State to tune the model parameters, and perform sen-
sitivity analysis to understand the risk of infection, and evaluate the efficiency of different
containment strategies in terms of both human and bird infections.
Methods and Designs
The model for the spread of avian influenza is derived from the general form of the vector-
borne disease, where the compartments for human are subscripted by H , and the compart-
ments for birds (vectors) are subscripted by B. The infections among birds are associated
with contacting infectious birds, while the transmission from the susceptible to the infec-
tious in human is associated with contacting infectious birds, as well as their saliva, mu-
cous, and feces. The spread of avian influenza A viruses from one ill human to another is
rare. However, because of the high possibility of viruses to mutate and gain such an ability,
the human-to-human transmission is also included in the model.
49
In this study, we apply an SEIRD (Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Recovered, De-
ceased) model to describe the disease spread among the human population. The human
population is assumed to follow a logistic growth with carrying capacity KH and growth
rate r during the outbreak. The virus transmission among birds is modeled with an SID
(Susceptible, Infectious, Deceased) model. The bird population is assumed to have a con-
stant death rate ν and a variable birth rate Λ(t) such that the total population is constant
KB. Figure 1.10 shows the transition diagram.
SH EH IH DH
RHSB IB DB
Figure 1.10: Avian influenza: transition diagram of the compartmental model.
Assume the probability of a human recovering from an infection is p, the base-
line contact rate between humans is βH , and the baseline contact rate between humans
and birds is βB→H . Under this assumption, if we align the human compartments as
SH , EH , IH , RH , DH , and align the order of bird compartments as SB, IB, DB, then the
model matrices for the human population are
DH =

0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 p 0 0




0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0




































































 , λ(yB) =





By arranging the compartments corresponding to infections as EH , IH , IB and evaluating








µHE + r 0 0
−µHE µHI + r 0
0 0 µBI + ν

By applying the method of next generation matrix, the basic reproduction number for the
system is
R0 = ρ(FV −1) = max
{
βH→HKHµHE





The first component in the equation is the basic reproduction number within the human
compartments, and the second component is the basic reproduction number within the bird
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compartments. Since human-to-human infection of avian influenza is inefficient and rare
[26], we can conclude that βH→HKH  βB→BKB, thus the basic reproduction number
of the system is determined by the infections among the birds. To quickly contain an
avian influenza outbreak, it is desirable to reduce the basic reproduction number such that
R0 < 1 so that an infected bird produces less than one new infection during its infectious
period. This can be achieved by either reducing the adjusted baseline contact rate βB→B by
quarantining the poultry farms with confirmed cases, or reducing the bird population KB
by slaughtering infectious birds, both wild and live poultry.
To examine the performance of the model and understand the effectiveness of contain-
ment strategies, we perform sensitivity and scenario analysis using the 2010 avian influenza
data in Egypt. We vary the contact rate between birds (βB→B), and the duration of infec-
tion in birds (µBI). We report the estimated number of infections in both birds and humans,
as well as time to reach containment. The simulation is performed until an asymptotic
behavior is achieved, i.e., when no new cases are reported.
Results
Egypt. Egypt is considered an important poultry producer in the Arab world with 1.5
million permanent workers and 1 million temporary workers in poultry production. The
combination of commercial poultry, backyard birds, and live-bird markets exposes Egypt
to the danger of avian influenza outbreak. Evidence shows that stable lineages of H5N1
viruses have been established among chickens and humans in Egypt, and the control efforts
and international cooperation is in urgent need [2]. We use the data of reported infections
in live poultry of an HPAI outbreak in Egypt during January to June 2010 for our analysis.
The total number of reported cases in live poultry was 317,400 by containment.
Figure 1.11 contrasts the reported cases in live poultry against the simulation result
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Table 1.4: Avian influenza: parameters used in modeling the outbreak in Egypt.
Name Notation Value Literature Source
Initial live poultry population SB 1.8× 109 [2]
Initial infected live poultries IB 3,000 Fitted
Average live poultries lifespan 1/ν 60 days [74]
Average live poultries lifespan
after infection 1/µBI 10 days [114]
Baseline infection rate between
live poultries βB→BKB 58/day Fitted
Baseline infection rate between
live poultries and humans βB→HKH 2× 10
−4/day [114]
Baseline infection rate between humans βH→HKH 1.5× 10−7/day [114]
Initial human population (Egypt) SH 8.2× 107 World Bank
Natural population growth rate (Egypt) r 1.6% World Bank
Basic reproduction number R0 1.362 Calculated
by varying the contact rate (βB→BKB) and the duration of infection (µBI) in live poultry.
The results suggest that Table 1 provides good estimates for the reported cases (green solid
curve from simulation against the red dotted curve of reported cases). When the base-
line contact rate increases from 56 per day to 58 per day (dotted against the dashed green
curves), the cumulative infections in bird compartments increase from 0.22 million to 0.46
million by June 2010 (110% increase). Varying the duration of infection in birds seems to
have a larger impact on the trend of the outbreak (the three solid lines). When increasing
the bird infection time from 9 days to 11 days, not only the total infections at containment
sees a 4-fold increase (0.16 million to 0.6 million), the time to containment is delayed by
two months as well (April 2010 to June 2010). Therefore, reducing the infection dura-
tion of birds plays a crucial role in controlling the trend of the avian influenza outbreak.
This can be achieved by providing medical countermeasures to affected poultry farms, or
quickly removing/isolating infectious live poultry upon identification of an outbreak.
Next, we focus our analysis on the infections among humans using the parameters from
























Contact rate = 56/day, duration of infection = 10 days
Contact rate = 58/day, duration of infection = 10 days
Contact rate = 60/day, duration of infection = 10 days
Contact rate = 58/day, duration of infection = 9 days
Contact rate = 58/day, duration of infection = 11 days
Figure 1.11: Avian influenza: sensitivity analysis of the outbreak in Egypt.
contact rate to live poultry (βB→H), 2) slaughtering infectious live poultry (IB), and 3)
quarantining infectious humans (IH). Each strategy is assumed to be in effect starting on
February 20, 2010. Without any intervention, the total infection reaches 540 and will be
contained by June 2010.
Figure 1.12(a) shows that reducing contact rate by 20% will reduce the total infections
to 453 (16% reduction), although it does not significantly improve the time of contain-
ment. However, the containment will be achieved by May 2010 with 278 infections when
the contact rate is reduced by 60%. This shows that reducing contact rate is highly effec-
tive in minimizing the total infections and containment time. This strategy is also easy to
implement: residents should be advised to avoid contacting birds or their saliva, mucous
and feces; and poultry farm workers should be advised to use proper protective equipment
while working close to the poultry.
Figure 1.12(b) suggests that slaughtering infectious live poultry is equally effective.
It has similar efficient frontiers as reducing contact rate in controlling human infections.
However, it also controls the outbreak within the live poultry. Unlike reducing contact rate,
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Figure 1.12: Avian influenza: contrast outbreak trends for different strategies in Egypt.
also reduces the danger of susceptible birds being exposed to the virus. This leads to
earlier containment within the live poultry. However, there are practical difficulties with
this approach: the management of the bird carcasses and the potential economic impact.
Incineration of the dead birds has been a common practice.
Figure 1.12(c) shows that with the current baseline infection among humans at 1.5 ×
10−7. The effect of human-to-human infection is negligible: all 5 curves are almost the
same. But this could become a threat due to the high mutation probability of avian influenza
viruses. Mutant species which can be easily transmitted among humans may emerge; hence
epidemiologists and healthcare leaders should closely monitor such a possibility.
Figure 1.12(d) shows the combination effect of reducing contact rate and reducing in-
fectious poultry. When both strategies are implemented at 20% level, the total number of
infections at containment is approximately 400. Since implementing a single strategy at a
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high efficiency level may be inherently difficult, combination strategies are appealing and
can generate satisfactory containment results.
A significant concern to public health officials is to understand when the intra-human
infection of avian influenza will pose a major threat to public health. By varying the base-
line infection rate between humans (βH→HKH) while keeping other parameters fixed as
given in Table 1.4, Figure 1.13 shows that the trend of the avian influenza outbreak in hu-
man remains insignificant unless the baseline infection rate is increased from 1.5 × 10−7
to 0.15. Although such a possibility is small, it will result in more than 5,400 infections
in humans at containment, 7 times more when compared to the original scenario. Since
the human mortality rate is very high, it is imperative that epidemiologists and healthcare
officials are vigilant in monitoring the mutations of avian influenza viruses, and take proper
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Current Infectivity = 1.5E-7
Figure 1.13: Avian influenza: sensitivity analysis of baseline infection rate between hu-
mans in Egypt.
United States. In this scenario, besides the factors discussed in the previous section,
we also explore the impact of transportation and migration of infectious birds on disease
trend of an avian influenza outbreak. For brevity, we only consider infections among birds.
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To model the change of bird population in each state due to commercial transportation
or migration, we introduce a transportation matrix ΩN×N = 〈ωab〉|1≤a,b≤N , where ωab
represents the percentage of birds transported from state a to state b in a unit time, and N is
the total number of states considered in this setup. Each state is assigned a unique instance
of Equation 1.10b with its own initial bird populations, and the transportation matrix Ω
is used to connect all the states. More rigorously, let Y m×N = [y1,y2, . . . ,yN ] be the
collection of stage vectors of all states, where m is the number of total compartments for
birds in Equation 1.10b. Then the ordinary differential equation with the transportation and
migration of birds can be written as






+ λB(Y ) + Y (Ω− diag(Ω · 1))
where ek is the k-th standard basis vector. In this scenario, we assume that the initial
infection starts in Ohio with 30,000 infectious birds. If no restrictions are placed on the
transportation of live poultry and no interventions are implemented, the spread of the virus
is shown in Figure 1.14, where the upper panel shows the real-time infections, and the
lower panel shows the cumulative infections. By day 100 of the outbreak, the virus has
already spread to neighboring states and most of the northeast region. By day 300, the
virus has spread to the midwest and southern regions, and the trend of the outbreak is still
increasing, as shown in the light green solid curve in Figure 1.15. The cumulative number
of infections in birds in the entire United States will reach 1.8 million by day 300, and some
states with high poultry production will be severely affected, causing potential dangers to
the health of poultry farm workers as well as residents.
We will examine two intervention strategies for this scenario: 1) reducing the prob-
ability of transporting infectious birds to other states by enforcing strict regulations and
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Figure 1.14: Avian influenza: spread in US after the initial outbreak.
examinations on the transportation of live poultry and/or poultry products; 2) reducing
the population of infectious birds by slaughtering infectious poultry and wild birds. Both
strategies are assumed to be implemented one month after the initial outbreak.
Figure 1.15(a) shows the effect of reducing transportation of infectious live poultry and
controlling the migration of infectious wild birds. Without any intervention, the outbreak
will start to show signs of containment by day 700, and the total number of infectious birds
at containment will be near 2.6 million. If a 20% reduction of infectious transportation is
achieved, the containment will start on day 200, and the total infections in bird population
at containment will be 1.1 million, a 58% reduction. If this strategy is implemented at 80%
level, the outbreak will start to be contained by day 120 (almost one and a half years ear-
lier compared to no intervention), and the total infection in bird population at containment
will be 0.6 million, a 77% reduction. This result demonstrates that by imposing strict reg-
ulations and examinations on live poultry transportation, the containment will be reached
earlier, and the total number of infected birds will be reduced significantly. Another ad-
58
vantage of this strategy is that it can confine the outbreak within a small region so that it is
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Figure 1.15: Avian influenza: bird infections in US under two containment strategies.
Figure 1.15(b) shows the effect of slaughtering infectious birds one month after the ini-
tial outbreak. Although slaughtering infectious birds alone is not as effective as reducing
transportation and does not change the disease trend significantly, it does reduce the number
of infections at containment. For example, when 40% of infectious birds are slaughtered
after one month of the initial outbreak, the cumulative number of infections at containment
will be 1.67 million, a 36% reduction compared to no intervention. The number of infec-
tions at containment will be 0.74 million, a 72% reduction, when 80% of infectious birds
are slaughtered. However, this strategy has both environmental and economic concerns,
and the disposal of carcasses of slaughtered birds remains a difficult problem to solve30.
Combination of containment strategies will be effective and promising, as shown in Figure
1.16. Implementing both strategies at 20% level will reduce the number of infections by
containment to 0.95 million, a 63% reduction. When both strategies are implemented at











































Figure 1.16: Avian influenza: effect of combination strategies in US.
Discussion
This work signifies the idea of “digital disease surveillance” in preparing for and respond-
ing to pandemic outbreaks. We develop a general-purpose modeling framework for digital
surveillance that couples compartmental models (with separate groups of compartments
for human and carrier populations) with human behavior and operations processes. We
demonstrate its usage for analyzing avian influenza. The modeling framework is capable of
tracking the development (and interplay) of epidemics in both groups. It also incorporates
the natural population growth and effect of migration and transportation into consideration.
We analyze the development of the avian influenza outbreaks and investigate parameters
that have significant impacts on epidemic severity. We study the effect of average contact
rate between birds and the average time that birds stay infectious. The analyses are per-
formed using the real data from an outbreak in 2010 in Egypt. Our analyses show that the
trend of avian influenza outbreaks is sensitive to both factors, and accurate parameter esti-
mation of the biological properties of avian influenza viruses is crucial to the performance
of the model.
We explore three containment strategies for the outbreak data from Egypt to mitigate
and minimize infections among humans: reducing human contact rate to birds, slaughtering
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infectious birds/live poultries, and quarantining infectious humans. The first two strategies
show similar effectiveness in containing the outbreak and reducing the number of infections
in humans, while there is marginal effect in the quarantining infectious humans. This
shows that the key factor in containing an avian influenza outbreak lies in controlling the
infections in birds and reducing the chances of human contacting infectious birds. The
human-to-human infections effect of avian influenza is low; however, it is possible that
mutations may lead to more significant human-human infections.
Analyses are also carried out using the poultry farm and production data in the United
States. Two containment strategies are contrasted: 1) reducing transportation or migration
of infectious birds, and 2) slaughtering the infectious bird population. Both strategies are
effective, with the former confining the outbreak within a localized region for more man-
ageable containment operations. These findings indicate that regardless of the objectives,
the outbreak in the bird population should be tackled first, and the containment strategy
should be determined based on environmental and demographic information, as well as
transportation/movement and bird migration patterns.
The model provides a decision support framework for policymakers to estimate the po-
tential risk of an outbreak and the cost-effectiveness for different containment strategies.
Combination strategies turn out to be practical and cost-effective in achieving disease-free
equilibrium. Healthcare departments should select a strategy portfolio in accordance with
the local environment, demographics, and the composition of the bird population. To fur-
ther expedite the containment, the public should be educated and informed of the knowl-
edge regarding avian influenza, as human behaviors have a profound impact on the virus
transmission.
Informatics and social media play an important role in tracking disease spread and sup-
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porting epidemiology modeling and containing disease outbreaks and have already demon-
strated their capability in helping prevent influenza outbreaks [211]. The most challenging
part is that how classical mathematical models fit and perform in this digital era. Our
proposed modeling framework is also highly sustainable with the support of modern in-
formation technologies, which provide valuable inputs to our model. With the continuous
data input, the model can adjust the parameter estimations to better predict the potential
outcomes of pandemics, reflect changes in the environment, human behavior, and pub-
lic policies as the outbreak develops and provide meaningful insights to the containment
strategies in real-time to better facilitate the decision-making process. It can also be easily
cast to accommodate newer disease propagation structures, additional stages introduced by
intervention or hospitalization, and changes in the pattern of disease transmission, making
it sustainable both theoretically and practically.
There are limitations to our study. Although the modeling framework we proposed
is flexible and capable of modeling complicated scenarios, we used a relatively simple
setup in the examples with homogeneous bird and human populations without any treat-
ment or vaccination effects. Different bird species have various infectivity regarding avian
influenza, and the contact rate for birds differs between poultry farm workers and gen-
eral civilians. Antiviral drugs and vaccines against avian influenza also exist and could
be added to the model. These components require more parameters to estimate and may
possibly lead to over-fitting. However, with the availability of such data, these effects can




DISEASE PROPAGATION MODELS FOR MEDICAL OPERATIONS AND
COUNTERMEASURES
In this chapter, we extend the modeling framework proposed in Chapter 1 to incorporate
the impact of medical operations and countermeasures on the trend of infectious disease
outbreaks in two different ways: 1) optimizing the distribution of limited medical resource
to achieve the best containment result; 2) modeling the disease propagation and transition
of stages in the population inside and outside medical facilities to understand role medical
operations and countermeasures plays during pandemics. Then we discuss two applications
of the proposed models to assist decision-making in the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa
and the optimal prioritized vaccination strategy for a smallpox outbreak.
2.1 Literature Review
Decision-making during infectious disease outbreaks is crucial to achieving early epidemic
containment, minimizing the total number of infections, and optimally allocating medical
resources. Infectious disease models can be used to understand the effects of containment
efforts and provide guidance for implementing interventions during outbreaks. Compart-
mental models provide accurate forecasts for the potential development of outbreaks and
incorporate complex system dynamics of infectious disease propagations. They have been
used to assist developing intervention strategies and evaluating the performance and ef-
ficiency of various medical operations and countermeasures during epidemics before im-
plementation to help decision-makers identify the most cost-effective strategy and unveil
potential influence of different types of interventions. Multiple studies have introduced
human interventions and behavior changes to the existing compartmental models to inves-
tigate their effect.
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An intuitive way to extend the current compartmental model is to include multiple addi-
tional stages introduced by human interventions combined with healthcare system model-
ing. Legrand et al. studied the dynamics of Ebola pandemics using data from two different
pandemics, quantified the transmission rates with various scenarios including illness in the
community, hospitalization, and traditional burial, and ran simulations of these scenarios
to explore the impact of control interventions on a potential epidemic [145]. Rivers et al.
used data from Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak to param-
eterize a mathematical model for forecasting the efficacy of different intervention methods
including increased contact tracing, improved infection control practices, and the use of a
hypothetical pharmaceutical intervention [185]. Lee et al. studied the effect of vaccina-
tion and special treatment during an influenza outbreak with a limited supply of vaccines
by extending the existing 6-stage compartmental model [143]. Fukuda et al. assessed the
effect of voluntary vaccination and its impact on a network structure, combined the human
intervention and behavior changes during disease outbreaks, and concluded that the public
information has a positive impact on containment given the vaccination cost is small [92].
Among all intervention strategies, hospital-based interventions and community-based
interventions are widely used, and mathematical models have been developed to evaluate
the impact of these two types of intervention strategies during pandemic outbreaks. Riley
et al. studied the transmission dynamics of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
in Hong Kong and addressed the importance of shortening the delay between the onset
of symptoms to hospitalization as well as improving the isolation effect inside hospitals
[184]. Nkoghe et al. conducted a case study of a regional Ebola virus outbreak in Re-
public of Congo in 2005 and discussed the impact of isolation ward and proper training
of healthcare workers within hospitals on the effect of reducing the number of new infec-
tions and preventing in-hospital transmission [171]. Pandey et al. developed a stochas-
tic model for Ebola outbreak in West Africa and evaluated the virus transmissions within
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and between different communities with data from Liberia. They concluded that isolation,
contact-tracing with quarantine, and sanitary funerals must be prioritized to control the out-
break. They also found that an insufficient amount of beds and low admission rates to hos-
pitals reduce the effectiveness of hospital-based interventions [174]. Milne et al. proposed
a small community model for the spread of infectious diseases and used the household
structure and exact individual-level contact patterns to model the spread of influenza. They
evaluated four community-based interventions including school closure and increased case
isolation and concluded that multiple social distancing strategies need to be implemented
early and continuously for optimal transmission interruption [163].
With the availability of modern transportation, global pandemic outbreaks are more
probable to occur and more difficult to mitigate [53]. Global-level intervention strategies
have been proposed and studied, aiming to provide quantitative analysis to support the
decision-making processes. Balcan et al. proposed the global epidemic and mobility model
which combines sociodemographic and population mobility data and a stochastic disease
propagation model with a spatial structure to predict the spread of infectious diseases at
the global scale and discussed how intervention strategies can be incorporated into this
modeling framework to mitigate and contain epidemics [18]. Gomes et al. studied the
risk of international spreading the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa based on the global
epidemic and mobility model, using agent-based simulation to predict the spread of Ebola
virus worldwide. They showed that local interventions to mitigate regional outbreaks and
traveling interventions to reduce case importation are both effective policies to prevent
global Ebola pandemic [98]. Similarly, Poletto et al. assessed the impact of the travel ban
to affected areas of the 2014 Ebola outbreak and used numerical simulations to evaluate the
results. They concluded that travel ban alone only delays the risk of outbreaks extending
to other countries, and additional intervention strategies need to be implemented to prevent
further geographical spread [179]. McCloskey et al. addressed the importance of effective
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collaboration between countries within a unified framework to achieve rapid detection of
pandemics and start public health responses immediately after the initial outbreak [157].
2.2 Resource Allocation for Containing Disease Outbreaks
During infectious disease outbreaks, the supply of medical resources and the availability
of healthcare workers are always not enough to implement the containment strategies at
desired levels. Therefore, optimal allocation of limited resources is crucial for achieving
early containment and minimizing total infections. In this section, we discuss a resource
allocation problem based on the general-purpose disease modeling framework proposed in
Chapter 1 and provide a numerical method to solve the problem.
2.2.1 Additional Stages for Intervention Modeling
Due to the human interventions during the disease outbreaks, new stages that are not natu-
ral to the disease propagation will be introduced to our existing modeling framework. An
example of stages of human intervention is hospitalization. Individuals in the hospital-
ization stage will have a higher recovery rate and a lower mortality rate due to treatment,
and a lower contact rate to the populations in other stages. However, the availability of
hospitalization is constrained by the number of beds in the healthcare facilities, the num-
ber of healthcare workers and doctors, and the availability of necessary medical resources.
Other examples of stages introduced by human intervention include vaccination, where
susceptible individuals can become vaccinated and have a lower probability of getting in-
fected, constrained by the availability of vaccines and the processing rate at vaccine clinics;
and quarantine, where infectious individuals will have a lower contact rate to the healthy
groups. Since infectious individuals can perform self-quarantine at home, the availability
is usually not constrained.
If we focus on the macroscopic aspect of the disease propagation, i.e., ignore the de-
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tailed operations within the stages introduced due to human interventions and treat them as
black boxes, the modeling framework proposed in Chapter 1 will be sufficient to incorpo-
rate these new stages. Consider the SEIR model with an additional stage for hospitalization
H shown in Figure 2.1.
S E I R
H
Figure 2.1: Demonstration of an SEIR model with hospitalization.
Assume that individuals in stage H are quarantined, then using the categorization of
stages, H ∈ ΦU and H ∈ ΦA. Assume the mean time for an individual from becoming
infectious to being hospitalized is 1/µT and arrange the stages as {S,E, I, R,H}, then the
model matrices of the modeling framework becomes
D =

0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 µI/(µI + µT ) 0 1




0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

If we further assume the mean duration for hospitalization is 1/µH , then the rest of
model parameters are
µ = (0, µE, µI + µT , 0, µH)
ᵀ,β = (β, 0, 0, 0, 0)ᵀ
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Plugging these modeling matrices into the general-purpose modeling framework for
contact-based diseases will yield the system of ordinary differential equations that capture
human interventions. On the other hand, if the individuals in stage H are not fully quar-
antined, but contact populations in other stages at a reduced rate, then we may modify the
disease contagious matrixC for this scenario. In this case, H ∈ ΦC . Let η = 〈ηφ〉|φ∈Φ de-
note a vector of contact rate modification factor for each compartment φ ∈ Φ. For stage φ
that does not correspond to human interventions, ηφ = 1; for stage φ that correspond to the
contagious stage but with a diminished contact rate, ηφ < 1. Different from the previous
example, since now H ∈ ΦC , the disease contagious matrix becomes
C =

0 0 −1 0 −1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

Then we can substitute the matrix C with Cdiag(η) in the modeling framework to
reflect the change of contact rate due to human interventions.
2.2.2 Modeling Framework with Interventions
In our modeling framework, human intervention may impact the spread of infectious dis-
eases in two ways: affecting the development of the disease by hospitalization, treatment,
or vaccination, and affecting the generation of new infections by quarantine and reducing
contact rate. Start with the case of contact-based diseases. Mathematically, since the conta-
gious structure of the infection is inherent to the disease itself, the disease contagious matrix
C will not be changed by human interventions. The first type of intervention changes the
mean transition rate at the active stages, i.e., µ. By altering µ, the disease development ma-
trixD may also be changed; the second type of intervention changes the baseline infection
68
rate β.
Let vector r(t) denote the availability of multiple medical resources at time t, and
the value of r(t) has impact on both µ and β. Consider two functions f(µ, r(t)) and
g(β, r(t)) that output the updated value of mean transition rate of active stages µ and
baseline infection rate of vulnerable stages β at time t with the available medical resource
r(t). As the disease development matrix D may rely on the value of µ but not directly
controlled by the available medical resource r, the updated disease development matrix
can be written as D(f(µ, r(t))). Then we may substitute the constants µ, β and D in the
original modeling framework with the time-variant parameters described above to model
the effect of different ways of human interventions.
Since interventions will change the level of medical resource inventory and there may
be possible resupplies and other consumptions of the medical resources, the derivative of
r(t) should also be fully explored to correctly model the system dynamics with interven-
tions. The consumption rate of medical resources is fully described by the current change
rate of population among all stages y′(t) and the current level of medical resources r(t)
in the form of ξ(y′(t), r(t)). On the other hand, assume the rate of resupply and other
consumptions of medical resources is π(t), then the change rate of medical resources can
be written as r′(t) = ξ(y′(t), r(t)) + π(t). For simplicity, we will omit the time variable
t in the following discussions. Combining the updated expression for y′ and the equation
for r′, the general-purpose modeling framework for contact-based infectious diseases with
human intervention can be written as
y′ = (D(f(µ, r))− I)diag(f(µ, r))y
+ diag((D(f(µ, r)) + I)diag(g(β, r)y))Cdiag(η)y (2.1a)
r′ = ξ(y′, r) + π (2.1b)
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Consider the SEIR model with hospitalization discussed in the previous section, but
now assume that the hospitalization stage has a capacity M . If the number of hospitalized
individuals reaches M , no more infectious individuals will be treated. In this example,
there is a single medical resource r = max{M−H, 0}, which is the vacancies in hospitals,
and it has only impact on the vector µ. Therefore, g(β, r) = β. To understand how the
vacancies in hospitals impact the vector µ, notice that the transition rate from infectious
stage to hospitalization stage is µT if r > 0, and is 0 when r = 0. Therefore, the transition
rate from infectious stage to hospitalized stage is a variable µTI{r > 0}, where I is the
indicator function. Therefore,
f(µ, r) = (0, µE, µI + µTI{r > 0}, 0, µH)ᵀ
If we assume that the capacity of hospitals remains constant throughout the outbreak,
then π(t) = 0 for all t > 0. Thus the consumption and resupply of the medical resource r is
solely determined by the change in the size of hospitalized individuals under this assump-
tion, i.e., ξ(y′, r) = −eᵀHy′ = −H ′(t). Therefore, r′(t) = −H ′(t). Then we have fully
characterized the spread of infectious disease in an SEIR model with capacitated hospital-
ization using the models described in Equation 2.1. Notice that this modeling framework
can be easily extended to the vector-borne diseases by specifying the effect of medical
resources f(µ, r) and g(β, r) on both the human and vector populations.
2.2.3 Optimal Resource Allocation under the Modeling Framework
With human interventions and the use of medical resources properly incorporated in the
modeling framework for infectious disease outbreaks, the resource allocation problem can
be formulated as an optimization problem in two ways: minimizing the medical resources
needed throughout the outbreak with constraints on cumulative infections and/or contain-
ment time; and minimizing total infections and/or containment time with constraints on
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the availability of medical resources throughout the outbreak. Let u(t) denote some met-
rics related to the population vector y at time t which we are interested in to evaluate the
performance of different strategies of interventions. For example, if we are interested in






where eV is a |Φ|-dimensional vector with value 1 for vulnerable stages and 0 otherwise.
On the other hand, if we are interested in minimizing the time needed to reach outbreak
containment, we can define the metric variable at time t0 as u(t0) = I {eᵀV y′(t) < ε},
where ε is a threshold to determine if containment is achieved.
Similar to the function u(t) that provides a metric to evaluate the extent of disease out-
breaks, we can define a function v(t) that evaluates the value of the investment of medical
resources at time t during the outbreak. One intuitive example is the total quantity of the
medical resources. The medical resource minimization problem with constraints on the







s.t. u(t) ≤ ugoal(t) ∀t ∈ T
where the first type of objective function is suitable to model the usage of medical resources
that are not consumable, like vacancies in hospitals or the availability of healthcare workers,
and the second type of objective function can be used to model the usage of consumable
resources including medications, vaccines, etc. The constraint ensures that for any time
in the horizon of the outbreak T , the value of the evaluation metric u(t) reflecting the
severity of outbreak should be bounded by a pre-defined value ugoal(t). Similarly, the total
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infections minimization problem with constraints on the availability of medical resources
can be formulated as
min u(t0)
s.t. v(t) ≤ vavailable(t) ∀t ≤ t0
where the objective function is the metric u(t) evaluated at time t0, i.e., the severity of the
outbreak at time t0. The constraint ensures that during the time frame [0, t0], the usage of
medical resources should not exceed the availability of the resource vavailable(t) at any time.
To solve the resource allocation optimization problem, notice that evaluating a single
value of the objective function will require solving the entire system of ordinary differ-
ential equations until equilibrium is reached. Therefore, we use the following line search
algorithm to numerically solve the optimization problem:
1. First solve the system of ordinary differential equations until equilibrium is reached
and evaluate the value of objective function;
2. Introduce an increment of medical resources ∆r to the system and solve the updated
ordinary differential equations until equilibrium is reached;
3. Repeat step 2 until the constraint is satisfied for the first type of optimization problem,
or all medical resources are used up (i.e., the constraint is violated) in the second type
of optimization problem.
This algorithm is straightforward: we gradually introduce the interventions to the sys-
tem and observe the change of the trend of the outbreak caused by the intervention; repeat
this process until the constraints are satisfied or the resources are used up. This is also
an online algorithm, as the best solution observed so far can always be obtained when
the algorithm is interrupted. Since solving a system of ordinary differential equations to
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equilibrium is still computationally expensive, the following two strategies can be used to
accelerate the solving procedure:
* When the value of the objective function improves significantly (not saturated), a
larger step size of the increment of the medical resource can be used in each iteration.
When the improvement of the objective function starts to slow down, the step size
can be tuned down. This is similar to adjusting the learning rate in many machine
learning algorithms.
* The commonly used algorithm to numerically solve ordinary differential equations is
the fourth order Runge-Kutta method by averaging 4 increments, each one requiring
calculating y′ from scratch. However, infectious disease outbreaks either contain
within a certain duration or end up with infecting every individual in the environment
in practice. Therefore, the trend of the spread of infectious disease always follows
the “S” curve, i.e., the outbreak would go through an “initial growth–fast growth–
containment” cycle. The behavior of the system is highly regularized and we may
assume that the rate of change within a sufficiently small time interval is constant.
With this observation, we can use the first order approximation (Euler method) and
truncate the Taylor series at order 2 to solve the ordinary differential equations and
reduce the amount of calculation by ignoring the higher order terms. Our simulation
shows that the predictions of fourth order and first order approximation are almost
the same in most applications of disease propagation modeling.
With properly defined medical resources r, the evaluation metrics for the severity of
outbreak u(t), and the availability of medical resource v(t), the resource allocation problem
can be defined based on the general-purpose disease modeling framework and the optimal
intervention strategies can be obtained through solving the resource allocation problem.
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2.3 Modeling Medical Operations and Countermeasures
In this section, we discuss how to model the medical operations and countermeasures dur-
ing infectious disease outbreaks in a more microscopic aspect, instead of treating it as a
black box in the previous section. This modeling technique is used to determine if the per-
formance and the operation efficiency of healthcare workers are the bottlenecks of achiev-
ing fast containment, and can assist decision-makers to adjust the local operation strategies
accordingly for a better containment result.
2.3.1 POD Layout and Separation of Environment
In the following discussion, we assume that all the medical operations and countermeasures
happen inside point-of-dispensing sites (PODs). To clearly define what happens inside a
POD, the layout of the POD should be taken into consideration in the models. Figure 2.2
demonstrates a sample layout design for a POD: clients will arrive at the POD and visit the
triage station first. If they need further medical or mental assistance, they will be sent to the
corresponding station and the healthcare workers at that station will determine if they are
suitable to receive drugs or vaccines; otherwise, they will be sent directly to the dispensing
station.
Figure 2.2: A sample POD layout design.
Similar to the discussion in the previous section, to model the effect of human interven-
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tions inside the PODs, new stages need to be introduced to the original modeling frame-
work. The new stages can still be described using the categorization method discussed
earlier, but they do not belong to the natural process of disease propagation and cannot be
modeled using the disease transition matrixD; instead, such transition happens if and only
if when the proper intervention is performed on the corresponding population. Therefore,
dab = 0 if either stage a or stage b belongs to the compartments corresponding to human
interventions. In addition, we separate the environment in which the disease propagation
happens into two parts to depict the effect of PODs in the process of the disease outbreak:
intra-POD and outer-POD disease propagation. This separation also takes the different
population densities in the two environments into consideration, thus can correctly model
the increased contact rate due to the high population density inside the PODs.
The outer-POD disease propagation can be described using the same modeling frame-
work discussed in Chapter 1. However, the intra-POD disease propagation has two addi-
tional layers of complexity: the status of individuals inside the PODs can change due to the
natural propagation of infectious diseases, the service provided inside the PODs, and the
movement of individuals according to the POD layout. To properly capture this property
of intra-POD disease propagation, assume the considered POD has K different stations,
each of which provides certain service to the arriving clients. We assign a population vec-
tor yi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K} to each of the K stations and let y0 denote the population vector
outside the PODs. Therefore, besides the disease propagation model discussed in Chapter
1, two additional relationships need to be established between yi, i = {1, 2, . . . , K} to
model the change of population due to the medical operations provided by the PODs and
the movement of individuals inside the PODs.
Assume that station i is manned with ni healthcare workers, each of them provides the
same service at an identical nominal rate λi. Therefore, the actual service rate (departure
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rate) at station i for populations in stage φ is
hi(φ) = min{ni, ||yi||1}
λiφi
||yi||1
where φi is the number of individuals in stage φ at station i. Intuitively, the overall ser-
vice rate at station i is min{ni, ||yi||1}λi. Since individuals from multiple disease groups
are served at station i, this overall service rate is distributed across all the disease groups
according to the relative sizes of each disease group, hence the factor φi/||yi||1 is used to
adjust the service rate for each disease stage.
After receiving service at certain stages, clients can be transited to other stages. For
example, a susceptible individual will become vaccinated with a certain probability after
the service of vaccination stages. Since this type of stage transitions is not natural to the
disease propagation itself, it is not characterized using disease transition matrixD. Instead,
we use a stage-jump matrix J i = 〈jiab〉|a∈Φ,b∈Φ, where jiab is the probability of transiting
individuals from stage b to stage a at station i, to summarize the change of stages due to
the service performed at station i. If the service at station i does not change the status of
individuals in disease stage φ, then jiφφ = 1. Therefore, the summation of each column
of the stage-jump matrix J i is always 1. We use a matrix T to compactly summarize the
output rate at each station:
T = [J1h1(Φ),J2h2(Φ), . . . ,JKhK(Φ)]
where the i-th column of the matrix T indicates the rates at which the individuals from
different disease stages leaving from station i.
Besides the transitions between disease stages, clients move inside the PODs accord-
ing to its layout and design. To model the change of population due to the movement
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inside PODs, we define a station-jump matrix for each station inside the POD: Qi =
〈qiab〉|0≤a≤K,b∈Φ such that qiab is the probability of clients in disease stage bmoving to station
i after visiting station a. For completeness, we useQ0 to represent the matrix of the proba-
bility of clients in all disease stages moving from station a to the outer-POD environment.
This establishes the connection between intra-POD and outer-POD environments at the exit
of PODs. To build such connection at the entrance of PODs, let ψi, i = {1, 2, . . . , K} be an
indicator variable of whether station i is the first station to visit inside the POD. Addition-
ally, let λ = 〈λφ〉|φ∈Φ be the baseline arrival rate of individuals in each stage outside the
POD. To better reflect the realistic and typical emergency response in case of a pandemic
outbreak, we assume that the arrival rate of the PODs is a time-variant parameter instead of
a constant throughout the horizon of the disease outbreak. Therefore, the actual arrival rate




2.3.2 Modeling Framework for Medical Operations and Countermeasures
With the model parameters for medical operations and countermeasures defined in sec-
tion 2.3.1, the modeling framework for this application can now be derived. Consider the
population dynamics at station i inside the PODs. The change of populations can be de-
composed into four parts: change due to natural disease propagation, change due to clients
arrival from the outer-POD environment, change due to the processing rate at station i, and







the change of population due to these four reasons.
Obviously, y′i,1 does not involve in the operations inside the PODs and should remain
the same as the modeling framework discussed in Chapter 1; y′i,2 only depends on whether
the i-th station is the first station to visit in the POD; and y′i,3 is solely determined by the
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processing rate at station i. Use the contact-based disease as an example, we have





To derive the expression of y′i,4, consider the row that corresponds to stage φ in matrix
T : tφ· = [tφ1, tφ2, . . . , tφK ]. Each element in this row vector shows the departure rate
of individuals in stage φ from each station inside the POD. Then consider the column
corresponds to stage φ in matrix Qi: q·φ = [q1φ, q2φ, . . . , qKφ]ᵀ, where each element in
this column vector is the percentage of individuals in stage φ from each station that enters
station i. Therefore, the total population in stage φ that enters station i from all other
stations can be expressed as tφ·q·φ. Written compactly in matrix representation,
y′i,4 = diag(TQi)1
Then the system of ordinary differential equations for the population dynamics at sta-
tion i is




− hi(Φ) + diag(TQi)1
Similarly, the system of ordinary differential equations for disease propagation in outer-
POD environment is




Combining the ODE systems for intra-POD and outer-POD disease propagation yields
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the general modeling framework for the spread of infectious disease outbreak with medical
operations and countermeasures. Notice that this modeling framework is derived based on
the contact-based disease with only one POD. It can be easily generalized to model the sce-
nario for vector-borne diseases and for multiple PODs in the region. For example, to model
vector-borne disease, only the population dynamics due to disease propagation needs to be
edited, since the modeling structure for medical operations and countermeasures remain
the same regardless of the type of infectious disease. Therefore, the d1yi term can be re-
placed by the differential equation for vector-borne diseases discussed in Chapter 1. To
model the scenario with multiple heterogeneous PODs in the region, each of the POD can
be modeled separately with the method discussed above and then aggregated according to
the percentage of population served by that POD. Assume the region has M PODs, each
serving pi of the entire population, where
∑M
i=1 pi = 1. Therefore, POD i in that region
has a rate of arrival approximately equals to pidiag(λy0)/||y0||1. Additionally, since each
POD in the region may have different layout design and throughput rate, different matrices
T and Q that are specific to the settings of each POD can be assigned to the differential
equations to model the heterogeneity.
2.4 Applications
In this section, we discuss two applications of the proposed modeling framework for human
interventions and medical operations in containing the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
and prioritizing vaccine administration for smallpox outbreaks.
2.4.1 Containing the 2014 West Africa Ebola Outbreak
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa is the largest ever of its kind. In this section,
we derive a disease modeling and optimization framework to describe the development
of the outbreak, estimate the future trend, and optimally allocate the medical resources
available from the international aid to contain the outbreak. The study established a novel
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compartmental model for Ebola virus and took the infections among healthcare workers
into consideration. An optimization problem is formulated based on the results from the
compartmental model to allocate the medical resources. The framework discussed in this
study can also be applied to other epidemics to support the decision-making and emergency
response procedure.
Introduction
Ebola virus is a zoonotic filovirus that causes a hemorrhagic fever syndrome in humans,
with a high case-fatality rate. The 2014 West African Ebola virus outbreak is the largest
ever to occur and has been proven difficult to control. The occurrence of cases in large
urban centers enables the international spread via air travel, which may lead to global pan-
demics.
Mathematical models of infectious disease outbreak and epidemics are useful in utiliz-
ing the available information and transforming it into the knowledge of the disease while
providing strategies and guidelines to prevent the disease from becoming a global pan-
demic. Disease modeling focuses on describing the mechanistic of the disease and models
it as processes that result in the transition of individuals of the population between differ-
ent stages. Fisman et al. applied the simple inclined decay with an exponential adjustment
(IDEA) model to the epidemic and reproduced the observed pattern of disease growth. This
model describes epidemic processes both in terms of exponential growth and simultaneous
decay introduced by behavioral change, public health intervention, or any dynamic change
that slows the disease transmission [88]. Compartmental model is among the most popu-
lar methods to describe the disease propagation. Althaus described this outbreak with an
SEIR model and estimated the basic and the effective reproduction numbers in absence and
presence of control interventions [10]. Legrand et al. proposed a stochastic compartmental
model which classifies individuals into 6 stages and built the simulation based on this clas-
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sification of individuals with different transition rate between stages [145]. Based on this
model, Rivers et al. modeled five scenarios to examine their likely impact on the develop-
ment of the epidemic, including improved contact tracing, decreased contact rate, increased
proportion of hospitalized cases, and increased survival rate of hospitalized patients [185].
Chowell et al. described a transmission dynamics using an SEIR epidemiological model
with quantified effects of social distancing interventions. The time-dependent transmission
rate captures the effects of implementing public health interventions over time, which de-
picted the fact that the full effect of interventions is not seen immediately but gradually
takes hold in the population [50]. Zaman et al. introduced optimal control strategies of a
standard SIR model with time delay and use them to minimize the spread probability from
the infectious population [217]. Drake et al. developed a discrete time, stochastic pro-
cess model which comprises separate probability distributions for the number of secondary
cases arising from health care workers (HCW) infected in hospitals, non-HCW infected by
hospitalized patients, non-HCW infected from non-hospital care, and non-HCW infected
through burial practices [70]. Besides the compartmental models, other methods to pre-
dict the outbreak trend include network models [127], stochastic simulation [205], and the
Global Epidemic and Mobility model which captures the influence of potential traveling
patients [98, 179]. These models were used to describe the disease propagation and esti-
mate the potential impacts of Ebola virus.
Resource usage and allocation to contain the Ebola outbreak are also considered. Lew-
nard et al. developed a transmission model for Ebola virus and calibrated for the Ebola
outbreak in Montserrado County, Liberia. Based on this model, they estimated the num-
ber of beds at healthcare facilities needed to effectively control the disease in Montserrado
County is 4,800, which exceeds the 1,700 pledged by the USA to West Africa [147]. Bed
occupation was also estimated by using the number of cases reported at each time point
for the past ten Ebola virus outbreaks, while the maximum occupancy over the course of
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the outbreak is obtained to give the bed per outbreak [32]. The impact of Ebola Treatment
Centers (ETCs) capacity (such as the insufficient number of beds) and admission rate on
the hospital-based interventions and the early and drastic enhancement of infection control
measures in healthcare settings are also analyzed [171, 174].
Besides the characteristics of the Ebola virus and lack of public health infrastructure,
socio-culture in West Africa where the outbreaks take place also plays an important role and
complicated the implementation of control interventions. Funeral attendants could facili-
tate the development of major epidemics since the local cultural practices involve touching
the body of the deceased [17]. Lack of knowledge of the disease leads communities to
deny its existence and associate it with witchcraft or conspiracy theories [47]. These create
barriers for international intervention aiming to slow down the spread of Ebola.
In this study, we propose a compartmental model-based mathematical model to describe
the spread of Ebola virus in multiple West African countries during the 2014 outbreak in
both civilian and healthcare worker population. Additional stages including hospitalization
and funeral are included to characterize the special properties of Ebola virus. Then we for-
mulate an optimization problem on top of the output of the ordinary differential equations
and solve it with a line search algorithm to find the minimum number of beds in healthcare
facilities needed to achieve early containment in each country. We test our model using the
real data from Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia and compare the projected trend of the
outbreak under different scenarios with the actual reported cases. Our result suggests that
optimal allocation of limited medical resources during pandemics is crucial to minimize
the cumulative infections and achieve early containment.
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Methods and Designs
Based on the property of the Ebola virus and the availability of medical resources in West
Africa back in 2014, we propose an ordinary differential equation-based disease propa-
gation model that generalizes the SEIR model for Ebola. Additional stages are added to
depict the disease development of Ebola virus. Due to the high possibility of transmission
during the traditional funeral without protection, dead patients that do not receive crema-
tion will still be infectious. A new stage F for funerals is added to model the transmission
happens during funerals. If a dead patient is buried instead of receiving cremation, it is
not removed from the system immediately; instead, it stays in the stage F for a certain
period before being removed. During that period, it is able to infect others, and this period
is the funeral duration. Another new stage introduced to our model is H , which stands for
hospitalization. Infected individuals can get hospitalized with some probability (depending
on the availability of the medical resource), and they are quarantined from other civilians.
Therefore, patients in stage H are not infectious to civilians but are infectious to healthcare
workers that have direct contact with them. Similar to stage I , a patient in stage H can ei-
ther recover (R) or die, and the dead hospitalized patients can either be buried or cremated.
Therefore, the system for civilians contains seven stages: S (susceptible), E (exposed), I
(infectious), R (recovered), H (hospitalized), F (funeral), and D (deceased; removed from
system). Let N = S + E + I +R + F denote the total civilian population in the system.
The seven-stage model described above models the virus transmission among civil-
ians. The healthcare workers in West Africa are also in danger of getting infected, and
they face the different situations as the local civilians: they have proper protection, thus
the possibility of getting infected is lower than the civilians; they have enough resource
such that all infectious healthcare workers can get treated within a healthcare facility and
get quarantined from other people; the dead healthcare workers are dealt with caution so
that they do not infect others, i.e., there is no F stage for the healthcare workers. Let
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SH , EH , IH , HH , RH , and DH denote the six corresponding stages for healthcare workers.
Let NH = SH + EH + IH + RH denote the total population of healthcare workers in the
system. Notice that the two groups above are not isolated. Healthcare workers get exposed
(EH) because of their physical contact with the patients being hospitalized (H), as well as
the infectious healthcare workers (IH). In this study, the healthcare workers are assumed
to stay inside the healthcare facilities all the time so that they do not get infected through
contacting infectious civilians (I), and the infected healthcare workers (IH) do not infect
healthy civilians (S). However, these assumptions can be relaxed by using the time-variant
parameters discussed later.
Let µS denote the average number of infectious contacts each individual makes in a unit
time, i.e., the baseline contact or infection rate; µE is the transition rate from exposed stage
to the infectious stage and it is characterized by the incubation period of Ebola virus; µI is
the transition rate from infectious stage to stage R, F , and D and it is determined by the
duration of the infection; µIH is the transition rate from infectious stage to hospitalized or
the inverse of the time between infection to admission to healthcare facility; µH is the rate
from the hospitalization stage to other stages or the inverse of the duration of hospitaliza-
tion; µF is the transition rate from stage F to stageD and it is characterized by the duration
of the funeral.
Other parameters in the model include Hm, the total number of beds available. This
reflects the availability of healthcare resource. pHD and pD are the death rate with and
without hospitalization. pHF and pF are the percentage of funerals (non-cremation) for
deceased patients with or without hospitalization, respectively. pFS is the adjusted factor of
funeral infection rate, and f is the factor of healthcare worker transmission rate, reflecting
the protection of healthcare workers. Plugging these parameters to the modeling framework
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discussed in Equation 2.1 yields the following system of ordinary differential equations:
d
dt
S = −µS(I + pFSF )S
d
dt
E = µS(I + pFSF )S − µEE
d
dt
I = µEE − pHµIHI − µII
d
dt
H = pHµIHI − µHH
d
dt
R = (1− pD)µII + (1− pHD)µHH
d
dt
F = pFpDµII + pHFpHDµHH − µFF
d
dt
D = (1− pF )pDµII
+ (1− pHF )pHDµHH + µFF
d
dt
SH = −fµS(H + IH +HH)SH
d
dt
EH = fµS(H + IH +HH)SH − µEEH
d
dt
IH = µEEH − µIHIH
d
dt
HH = µIHIH − µHHH
d
dt




The model above divides the spread of disease into two types: the disease propagation
that happens outside the healthcare facilities and infects civilians, and the disease propaga-
tion within the healthcare facilities that infects healthcare workers. In addition, heteroge-
neous infectivity among civilians and healthcare workers is characterized by the factor f
to capture the proper protections of the healthcare workers. In addition, this model is not
limited to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa; by setting proper parameters, it can be used
to estimate the virus spread in any other country or predict the potential trend of outbreaks
of other types of contact-based diseases.
One major challenge faced by West African countries is the lack of healthcare facilities
and infrastructures. In particular, during the Ebola outbreak, the West African countries
like Guinea does not have enough beds in their hospitals or healthcare facilities, thus not
all patients can be quarantined or treated by healthcare workers. When there are no avail-
able beds, patients can only be treated at home, which brings risks to their relatives and
neighbors since their infectivity is much higher than the healthcare workers. The parame-
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ter pH in the model above can be used to capture the available beds in a country: if there are
beds available at hospitals or healthcare facilities, then pH = 1, i.e., infectious patients will
be admitted to quarantine; otherwise pH = 0. Essentially, pH can be seen as an indicator of
whether there are vacancies for quarantine. Therefore, pH = I{H < Hm}, where I is the
indicator function. We use the number of beds available in each country as the main factor
in controlling the spread of the virus and investigate the impact of availability and delayed
supply of beds to determine the number of beds required to contain the outbreak in each
country. Then we estimate the total infections through the end of 2015, including those of
healthcare workers. These additional beds and the corresponding resources and healthcare
workers are from international assistance. However, the international assistance is limited,
and devoting too many resources to the infected area does not necessarily accelerates the
containment, but increases the risk of infections among healthcare workers. Therefore, we
propose an optimization framework to minimize the number of beds required, or in general,
the medical resources, subject to the constraints on the total infections among civilians and
healthcare workers and the containment time. In particular,
minHm s.t. I∗ ≤ I0, I∗H ≤ IH0, T ∗ ≤ T0
where I∗ and I∗H are the numbers of infections among civilians and healthcare workers by
the end of 2015, respectively, while I0 and IH0 being the target number of infections among
these two population groups at the end of 2015. T0 is is the target time of containment, and
T ∗ is the actual time of containment, defined as:







i.e., the earliest time such that the increment rate of infections is controlled under a certain
level δ. Notice that other constraints can also be introduced to obtain the optimal allocation
of healthcare resources.
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The variables in this optimization framework are the output of the system of ordinary
differential equations shown earlier, thus searching for optimal solutions is computationally
expensive. We apply a line search algorithm for a given structure of parameters and search
for the optimal setting iteratively on the surface generated by the output of the differential
equations. Each iteration requires about 10 CPU minutes to solve.
Results
Base on the model proposed in the previous section, numerical experiments are performed
on three influenced countries: Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia to validate the model and
predict the trend of the Ebola outbreak. The parameters that are common in all experiments
are listed in Table 2.1.






between 8 and 12 days [76, 209]
Infection duration (1/µI)
Uniform distribution
between 5 and 9 days [209, 210]
Hospitalization duration (1/µH)
Uniform distribution
between 5 and 15 days [209]
Funeral duration (1/µF ) 1 day [170]
Percentage of cremation (1− pF ) 40% (70% after Dec 1, 2014) [170]
Percentage of cremation
if hospitalized (1− pHF )
80% [170]
Fatality rate (pD) 70% [209, 210]
Fatality rate if hospitalized (pHD) 50% [209, 210]
Adjustment factor of
healthcare worker transmission rate (f ) 0.05 [213]
Other parameters vary between countries, and the basic reproduction number for each
country is estimated using the historical statistics reported in each country. These parame-
ters are listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Ebola: model parameters specific to each country
Parameter
Value Literature
SourceGuinea Sierra Leone Liberia
Basic reproduction number (R0) 1.45 1.4 1.45 Fitted
Mean time from infection to
hospitalization (1/µIH)
3− 4 days 4 days 4 days [209]
Number of healthcare workers
as of Oct 1, 2014 300 1, 000 500 [212]
The number of projected infections in Guinea under different scenarios is fitted and
the result is shown in Figure 2.3. The intervention effect was observed starting from April
15. Changing the basic reproduction number R0 twice (1.45 to 0.9, then to 1.3) during
the intervention reflects the change of human behaviors and the effort of interventions with
public awareness of the disease outbreak. If the unreported cases are taken into consider-
ation, this model will have more predicting power. If a total of 50 beds were available in
middle April, the epidemic could have been rapidly contained in middle 2014 with no more
than 250 total infections. According to the WHO report, Guinea had 160 beds in October
2014. If this situation did not change since then, the epidemic would be contained in the
middle of 2015 and would result in about 3,800 infections by the end of 2015. If 200 beds
were available by November 2014, the outbreak would contain by the end of 2015 and the
cumulative infections would be about 3,500.
The number of infections in Sierra Leone under different scenarios is fitted and the
result is shown in Figure 2.4. The intervention started on August 1, 2014. According to the
WHO report, 130 beds and 300 beds were available on September 5, 2014, and September
17, 2014, respectively. If no additional beds were available since then, the epidemic would
contain in middle 2015 and the total infections by then end of 2015 would be 14,200. If 350
beds or 500 beds were available at the beginning of 2015, the epidemic would contain in





























Fitted Model (R0=1.45, No Intervention)
Fitted Model (R0=1.45, effective R0=0.9 after April 15, effective R0=1.4 after Aug 1, 50 beds available in mid April)
Fitted Model (R0=1.45, effective R0=0.9 after April 15, effective R0=1.4 after Aug 1, 160 beds available on Oct 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.45, effective R0=0.9 after April 15, effective R0=1.4 after Aug 1, 160 beds available on Oct 1, 200 

























Fitted Model (R0=1.4, no intervention)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, effective R0=1.2 after Nov 15, 50/130/300 beds available on Aug 1/Sep 5/Sep 17)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, effective R0=1.2 after Nov 15, 50/130/300/350 beds available on Aug 1/Sep 5/Sep 17/Jan 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, effective R0=1.2 after Nov 15, 50/130/300/500 beds available on Aug 1/Sep 5/Sep 17/Jan 1)




























Fitted Model (R0=1.45, No Intervention)
Fitted Model (R0=1.45, effective R0=0.9 after April 15, effective R0=1.4 after Aug 1, 50 beds available in mid April)
Fitted Model (R0=1.45, effective R0=0.9 after April 15, effective R0=1.4 after Aug 1, 160 beds available on Oct 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.45, effective R0=0.9 after April 15, effective R0=1.4 after Aug 1, 160 beds available on Oct 1, 200 

























Fitted Model (R0=1.4, no intervention)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, effective R0=1.2 after Nov 15, 50/130/300 beds available on Aug 1/Sep 5/Sep 17)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, effective R0=1.2 after Nov 15, 50/130/300/350 beds available on Aug 1/Sep 5/Sep 17/Jan 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, effective R0=1.2 after Nov 15, 50/130/300/500 beds available on Aug 1/Sep 5/Sep 17/Jan 1)
Figure 2.4: Ebola: infections in Sierra Leone under different scenarios.
The number of infections in Liberia under different scenarios is fitted and the result is
shown in Figure 2.5. The intervention started in September 2014. If the number of beds
available at the beginning of September 2014 was 500, then the epidemic would contain in
the early 2015 and the total infections would be 6,000. The number of beds available in
the early October 2014 was essential to the development of the disease. If 600 beds were
available on October 3, 2014, the predicted number of infection at the end of 2015 would
be 10,300; if these beds were delayed for two days, this number would become 12,700;
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if 20 more beds were available, the cumulative infections at containment would be 9,500.
Therefore, the number of beds available at the fast-spreading phase of the outbreak has a



















































































































Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 300/600 beds available on Sep 5/Oct 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 300/600 beds available on Sep 5/Oct 3)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 300/620 beds available on Sep 5/Oct 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 500 beds available on Sep 5)



























Guinea Sierra Leone Liberia
Figure 2.5: Ebola: infections in Liberia under different scenarios.
The number of infections among healthcare workers in the three countries is shown in
Figure 2.6. Though they have proper protection against the virus, the healthcare workers
are still in danger of infection due to their high contact rate to infectious populations. At the
initial phase of the pandemic, i.e., the second half of 2014, the number of infections among
healthcare workers increases drastically. For example, the infections among healthcare
workers in Liberia reached 250 after 6 months of the initial outbreak according to the
prediction. As the epidemic contains, the number of infections among healthcare workers
also stabilizes. There are several reasons to explain the rapid increment of infections among
healthcare workers: insufficiency of personal protective equipment before the international
interference, the improper use of the protective equipment, and too few medical staff for
the large outbreak at this scale. We should notice that the loss of medical staff including
experienced doctors and nurses has made it increasingly difficult to control the outbreak,
and the international community has to ensure a sufficient number of foreign healthcare
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Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 300/600 beds available on Sep 5/Oct 1)
Fitted M del (R0=1.4, 300/600 beds available on Sep 5/Oct 3)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 300/620 beds available on Sep 5/Oct 1)
Fitted Model (R0=1.4, 500 beds available on Sep 5)



























Guinea Sierra Leone Liberia
Figure 2.6: Ebola: infections among healthcare workers in 3 countries.
Discussion
In this study, we proposed a compartmental model to describe the spread of Ebola virus in
3 West African countries during the 2014 outbreak. This model consists of two parts: the
compartment model for civilians in West Africa, and the compartment model for healthcare
workers. We fitted the model based on the number of infections in Guinea, Sierra Leone,
and Liberia reported by CDC and predicted the trend of Ebola outbreak by the end of 2015.
It is estimated that the outbreak will contain by the end of 2015 given enough beds in
these countries, i.e., enough availability in hospitals and healthcare facilities so that most
infected civilians can get quarantined. If there were enough beds since the initial phase,
the outbreak could have been contained early; also, if the transition rate from stage I to
stage H is faster, which requires the rapid diagnosis of infectious patients and immediate
transition to hospitalization, the outbreak would also contain faster. The infections among
healthcare workers in the affected countries are also estimated. Though equipped with the
proper protections, the healthcare workers still are at risk of getting infected and this is
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extremely dangerous if they return to their countries.
The proposed model is general-purpose and can be easily extended to accommodate
more complicated scenarios, such as multiple groups with different parameters. In this
model, the baseline contact rate between civilians is treated as a constant. Since the Ebola
virus spreads via direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs or bodily fluids, the
possibility of infection rate of each individual in stage S may be different regarding how
they interact with the infectious individuals, or whether they make direct contact. Under
this setup, the civilians can be further divided into two groups and different parameters can
be assigned to differentiate these two different contacts. Similarly, as an increasing number
of organizations are involving in this outbreak, other groups such as volunteers and military
forces can be added to the model with their own compartments and model parameters. This
enables us to predict the number of infections among different groups and evaluates their
risk in West Africa respectively.
Another advantage of the proposed model is the capability of capturing human behavior
through the horizon of the outbreak. Instead of assigning each parameter a constant value,
we may set the parameters as functions of time. During different times of a day, people
act differently and this affects the spread of the virus. For example, the healthcare workers
may be out of the healthcare facilities or hospitals at the certain time of a day, and this
makes it possible that a civilian not in quarantine will make direct contact with a healthcare
worker. If the healthcare worker is infected but not hospitalized yet, the civilians may also
get infected. For this scenario, we can modify the ordinary differential equation systems








Where η(t) is a time-variant parameter indicating if the healthcare workers are out of the
healthcare facilities at time t, and pO is the proportion of the healthcare workers that are
out. Similarly, the healthcare workers that are outside may have direct contacts with the
infected civilians or the unsafe funeral. Then
d
dt
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This equation captures the behavior of healthcare workers during different times of the
day. Other equations in the system of ordinary differential equation can be updated accord-
ingly. Other parameters such as the basic reproduction rate can also be defined as functions
of time to accommodate the changes in policy or environment during the outbreak. This
enables the modeling and analysis of more complicated situations.
The disease modeling and optimization framework proposed in this study can be
adapted to other kinds of epidemics. With proper set up of the compartmental model
and parameters, as well as the definition of medical resources and the role they play in
controlling the spread of the disease, one can apply the similar methodology and analysis
procedure to predict the future development of the outbreak and estimate the optimal
allocation of medical resources to contain the outbreak. This will be of great significance
in the future preparedness of global pandemic.
2.4.2 Prioritized Vaccination Strategy to Contain Smallpox Outbreaks
When the vaccine supply is limited during infectious disease outbreaks, prioritized vac-
cination is broadly considered as an effective strategy. In this section, we propose a
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generic framework to model the effect of mass vaccination during pandemics. This model-
ing framework integrates the compartmental model for disease propagation and stochastic
queuing model for vaccination operations. We applied the model to a smallpox outbreak
and derived the optimal trigger for switching from prioritized to non-prioritized strategy
numerically to minimize the overall attack rate and mortality rate under different scenar-
ios. The value of optimal switching trigger is closely related to the vaccine supply level,
the composition of the population, and the properties of the disease. The effect of op-
timal mixed strategy is also governed by multiple model parameters including the delay
of vaccine supply, dispensing efficiency, and accuracy of triage. Therefore, to maximize
the protective effect of available vaccines, determining the optimal mixed strategy and im-
plementing the strategy effectively during on the ground operations are equally important.
This model can be easily generalized to solve the optimal switch trigger between strategies
for other types of disease outbreaks by supplying the corresponding disease propagation
structure and parameters. The system enables decision makers to find the best vaccination
strategy in real time to optimally utilize the limited medical resource and achieve faster
containments during pandemics.
Introduction
Vaccination is an important method for controlling the spread of infectious diseases world-
wide. However, the development and manufacturing of vaccines usually take months to
years, and vaccine shortages during epidemic outbreaks are not uncommon [168, 201].
The recent yellow fever outbreaks in Brazil and multiple African countries also exposed
the insufficiency in vaccine supply in case of large-scale infectious disease outbreaks [95,
129]. The condition of the outbreak is difficult to control without a continuous supply of
vaccines. On the other hand, Preparing and stocking vaccines for the population in the
entire U.S. is financially impractical [189]. The incapability of supply chain system in
some developing countries impedes the distribution of vaccines as well [120]. Because of
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the limited supply of vaccines, the effect of reduced and diluted dosage has been studied
[91, 132], aiming at covering more population with the current supply level of vaccines.
In addition, individual-level vaccine immunogenicity prediction using system biology and
machine learning is recently studied to improve the effect of vaccination [140, 181].
Besides the effort to best utilize vaccines at individual-level, systematically prioritized
vaccination is widely considered one of the best strategy to contain a pandemic [161, 202].
Normally, healthcare workers, children, pregnant women, and individuals with special
medical conditions will be classified as the high-risk group and be the first batch to re-
ceive the vaccines [178]. The proper definition of the high-risk group who receive vaccines
first is also extensively discussed [56, 77]. Since searching for the optimal prioritized
strategy for a general definition of risk groups under practical constraints can be compu-
tationally difficult, some studies solved a relaxation of the problem by assuming adequate
vaccine supply [199] or prioritizing a relatively simply-structured risk group [54]. Other
works on prioritized vaccination strategy include analysis fusing the spatial information
with demographic data [215], minimizing the year of life lost [162], and optimizing multi-
ple evaluation metrics [160].
Wallinga et al. studied the optimal allocation of medical resources with limited data by
targeting intervention measures at the group with the highest risk of infection per individ-
ual [206]. Mylius et al. studied the vaccination strategy under different supply scenarios
of influenza vaccines and suggested prioritizing individuals with high-risk of complica-
tions [166]. Patel et al. used stochastic epidemic simulations and meta-heuristic to find
the optimal vaccine distributions [176]. Computer simulation is also used to compare dif-
ferent prioritization strategies and definitions of risk groups to assist decision-making, as
discussed in Lee et al. [133, 134]. While most studies assume the supply of vaccines is
instant, Meyers et al. optimized the allocation of vaccines when there is a delay in vaccine
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supply [159]. In practice, most public health departments in the U.S. first use a prioritized
strategy to cover high-risk population and switch to a non-prioritized strategy later. Lee et
al. proposed a compartmental-based model to determine the optimal switch trigger between
prioritized and non-prioritized strategies [143] and solved the problem of determining the
switch point via numerical optimization.
In this study, we focus on the prioritized vaccination strategy to mitigate smallpox out-
breaks. Although smallpox has been eliminated since the 1970s and vaccinations are no
longer widely dispensed since then [85], it remains a threat to public health due to the
possibility of bioterrorism, and the preparation of mass vaccination events is necessary [6,
183]. Clinical researches suggest that smallpox vaccines may cause severe adverse reac-
tions [42]. However, dispensing smallpox vaccines, either targeted or mass vaccination, is
still considered as the most effective method of containing the outbreak [106]. Multiple
studies have already been carried out to identify the proper vaccination strategies in case
of a smallpox outbreak to achieve early containment and minimize the total infections [31,
87, 118].
We consider the mass vaccination strategy after the initial outbreak of smallpox us-
ing the same methodology described in [143] to find the optimal switch trigger between
prioritized and non-prioritized strategies. We develop a generic modeling framework for
human intervention, especially the effect of mass vaccination, on the disease propagation
process in compartmental models. The vaccination operations inside the vaccine clinics or
point-of-dispensing sites (POD) are explicitly modeled. Then we use numerical optimiza-
tions to find the optimal switch trigger in terms of minimizing overall attack and mortality
rate under different levels of vaccine supplies and severity of the outbreak (determined by
the basic reproduction number and the initial infectious population). Agent-based simula-
tion is used to validate our result. Sensitivity analyses are then performed on the proposed
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modeling framework and the robustness of the conclusion is examined. This modeling
framework not only applies to mitigating smallpox outbreaks but can assist the decision-
making process in various infectious disease outbreaks as well with correct compartmental
model plugged in. These properties make the model has practical attractions. Healthcare
departments and decision makers can input multiple model parameters with respect to the
biological feature of the disease, vaccine supply, demographic information, etc., and use
the suggested optimal switch trigger to facilitate the vaccine dispensing in emergencies to
minimize the infections and mortalities due to infections.
Methods and Designs
To study the transmission of smallpox in the population, we develop the baseline com-
partmental model with 6 compartments: susceptible (S), exposed (E), incubation period
(P ), infectious (I), recovered and immune (R), and deceased (D). Besides the change of
compartments due to disease propagation and new infections, the vaccination process is
also modeled in detail to reflect the importance of vaccination in controlling smallpox out-
breaks. We use the intra-POD and outer-POD disease propagations discussed in Section
2.3 to model the spread of the disease inside and outside PODs. The existence of POD
and vaccines adds two more compartments to our model: hospitalization (H) for visiting
individuals with symptoms of smallpox infections and will be properly treated and quaran-
tined, and vaccinated and immune (V ) for visiting individuals who received vaccines and
developed immunity. Figure 2.7 shows the stage transition diagram of this model, where
the solid lines are transitions associated with new infections and disease propagation and
the dashed lines are transitions associated with the vaccination and treatment.
Following up the model in Section 2.3, multiple PODs will be set up for dispensing
vaccines, and quarantine and treat infectious individuals in case of disease outbreaks. We
use the POD setup following the flowchart shown in Figure 2.8 to model the operations
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Figure 2.7: Smallpox: transition diagram with vaccination and hospitalization.
of PODs. Individuals at all stages may arrive at the POD, while only the asymptomatic
ones (susceptible, exposed, and incubation period) will receive vaccines, and we assume
that only the susceptible (S) and exposed (E) individuals may develop immunity after
vaccination based on previous researches on smallpox virus with a probability [109, 155].
Figure 2.8: Smallpox: flowchart for dispensing vaccines during an outbreak.
To demonstrate the importance of prioritizing vaccination, we separate the population
into five different risk groups: normal adults, children under 10 years old, pregnant women,
patients with associated diseases, and healthcare workers. The latter four groups are cat-
egorized as high-risk groups: healthcare workers have higher contact rates to infections;
children, pregnant women and patients with associated health conditions are more vulner-
able to infections [192]. In addition, since routine vaccination in the U.S. against smallpox
stopped in 1972 and worldwide in 1984 [85, 169], the younger individuals in the population
can also be prioritized should it be permitted. In the rest of this paper, we will use the risk
group model with five groups to discuss the prioritization of vaccines.
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To better reflect the realistic and typical emergency response in case of a pandemic
outbreak, we assume that the arrival rate of the PODs is a time-variant parameter instead of
a constant throughout the process of the disease outbreak. Let λ denote the baseline arrival
rate of individuals, i.e., the arrival rate at the beginning of the vaccination process if the
non-prioritized policy is used. Then if prioritized policy is used, all the arrivals are from




where NH is the total population of the high-risk group, and NH0 (t) is the amount of the
high-risk population at time t who have not visited the POD yet. With the progress of
vaccine administration, the arrival rate at PODs will gradually decrease as more individuals





with N and N0(t) being the initial population and population not visited POD in both the
high-risk and normal group. The basic arrival rate λ is inferred from our experience in
past time-motion studies, and the composition of population is obtained using the demo-
graphic statistics. Based on the expression of instant arrival rate, there will be an increase
in the arrival rate upon the switching, as the high-risk population is significantly smaller
compared to the normal group. The switch happens if the percentage of vaccines admin-
istrated to the high-risk group reaches the switch trigger g. In another word, let π be the
percentage of high-risk population, and let c denote the percentage of coverage with the
initial vaccine inventory. Then the switch happens if gc/π of the high-risk population are
protected. Therefore, if g = 0, then the corresponding strategy is full-non-prioritized, i.e.,
the vaccines are administrated to everyone regardless of their risk group; on the other hand,
if c ≤ g ≤ 1, then the associated strategy is full-prioritized, where all vaccines will be
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distributed to high-risk groups, and the normal group will not receive vaccines.
We use AR, the overall attack rate, as our evaluation metric. Overall attack rate mea-
sures the percentage of the population who experience the smallpox infection during the
horizon of the outbreak. It is the cumulative number of infections throughout the outbreak.
Then we seek the optimal switch trigger g∗ for the mixed strategy that minimizes the over-
all attack rate by the end of the outbreak with constraints on the availability of vaccines.
In our example, we assume that there is no replenishment of vaccine inventory. This can
be relaxed by introducing additional parameters to capture the arrival batches of vaccines
[143]. The objective function AR is derived from the output of the ODE system which is
controlled by the switch trigger g. Therefore, to obtain the optimal value g∗, we construct
multiple ODE systems by varying the value of g and run the system until equilibrium is
reached, then apply a line search algorithm to find the optimal solution that minimizes AR.
Due to the complexity and the nonlinearity of the ODE systems, each instance of switch
trigger optimization requires about 6,000 CPU minutes to solve.
The analyses we performed are based on the demographic statistics of the state of Geor-
gia with 10.21 million population, among which 19.30% are high-risk population (14.8%
children under 10 years old, 3.0% healthcare workers, 1.3% pregnant women, and 0.2%
patients with associated disease conditions). 43 PODs will need to be set up across the
state to provide vaccination and medical assistance for the entire region. Due to the limited
supply of smallpox vaccines, we assume that each individual will only receive one dose of
vaccine. These data will be supplied to the modeling framework proposed in Section 2.3 to
establish the system of ordinary differential equations to describe the dynamics of the sys-
tem during the smallpox outbreak. The parameters used in the simulation are summarized
in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Smallpox: model parameters used for analysis.
Parameter Value Literature Source




Basic reproduction number of smallpox 5 to 7 [75]
Percentage of initial infectious population 0.5% to 2.0% Assumed
Mean dwelling time of exposed stage 5 days [85, 109]
Mean dwelling time of incubation period 15 days [85]
Mean dwelling time of infectious stage 20 days [85]
Mean time between showing symptoms
to hospitalization/quarantine 1 day Assumed
Mean hospitalization time 10 days Assumed
Probability of vaccine effectiveness 90% [15]
Mortality rate without treatment 5% [85]
Risk factor of infection in different groups [1, 2, 1, 3, 3] Assumed
Initial baseline arrival rate 15/min Assumed
Our modeling framework is highly flexible and can be extended in multiple ways. Thus,
any configuration of the POD layout and any structure of disease propagation can be in-
corporated. Also, with the computational capability of RealOpt-POD [141], the large-scale
modeling and optimization system for public health infrastructure developed at CDC, we
use agent-based simulation to trace the behavior and status of every client inside the PODs
and use this result can to compare and validate the output of the ODE systems.
Results
We first demonstrate the result of optimal switch triggers for the mixed vaccination strategy
under three different scenarios: 20% vaccine supply, 30% vaccine supply, and 40% vaccine
supply, where the supply level indicates the percentage of total population that is covered.
Figure 2.9 shows the result of the overall attack rate and mortality rate against different
high-risk group coverage under the typical basic reproduction number of smallpox virus
R0 = 5 and initial infectious population set to 1%. The overall attack rate and mortal-
ity rate are evaluated on day 270 after the initial outbreak. The optimal switch triggers
and the associated high-risk group population coverage under the three different supply
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scenarios are marked. Notice that based on our assumption of the total population, a 1%
reduction in attack rate results directly to over 100,000 reductions in infectious individuals,
demonstrating the importance of applying the mixed strategy with optimal switch trigger.
In addition, the curvatures of all three scenarios tend to reach their maxima around the op-
timal trigger. This indicates that the selection of optimal switch trigger is rather robust and
can easily be translated into practical implementations with large fault tolerance. In case of
a real emergency, the inventory data of vaccines, the calculation of proportions of high-risk
populations, or the record of the administrated vaccines may not be accurate. Then the
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Figure 2.9: Smallpox: attack and mortality rate under different vaccination strategies.
Under the typical basic reproduction number of smallpox virus R0 = 5, the optimal
mixed strategy is superior to either non-prioritized or non-full-prioritized strategy. The
attack rates of three scenarios with the full-non-prioritized strategy are 13.4%, 8.56%, and
5.97%, respectively; the attack rates with full-prioritized strategy all converge to 9.58%,
as the vaccine supply can cover the entire high-risk population in all three scenarios. The
optimal mixed strategy, on the other hand, generates 9.32%, 6.97%, 5.35% attack rates in
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three scenarios.




Optimal mixed strategy % increase in attack rate
Switch trigger Attack rate Full-prioritized Full-non-prioritized
5
20% 86.85% 9.32% +2.79% +43.78%
30% 48.25% 6.97% +37.56% +22.81%
40% 29.92% 5.35% +79.07% +11.59%
6
20% 85.88% 19.02% +3.71% +43.51%
30% 47.54% 12.74% +55.18% +32.18%
40% 29.14% 8.21% +135.55% +18.87%
7
20% 84.81% 32.96% +4.11% +24.90%
30% 46.27% 22.37% +53.40% +26.34%
40% 28.98% 13.80% +145.84% +22.27%
Table 2.4 contrasts the optimal switch trigger for mixed strategy under different combi-
nations of vaccine supply level and basic reproduction numberR0. WhenR0 increases, the
optimal switch trigger for all supply levels drops, indicating that the time for implementing
non-prioritized strategy is earlier. This observation is intuitive since the more severe the
pandemic is, the earlier that the strategy protects all population instead of only the high-
risk population, as the high basic reproduction number tends to fade out the effect of high
infectivity associated with high-risk population. Results also suggest that the overall attack
rate evaluated at the containment of the optimal mixed strategy is much lower compared to
other two strategies and the optimal mixed strategy can halve the infections throughout the
outbreak in some cases (see 40% supply when R0 = 6). In addition, we observed that by
using the optimal mixed strategy, the outcome of cumulative attack rate can be superior to
that of non-optimal strategies with higher vaccine supply level. This as well addresses the
significance of optimal control in vaccine distribution.
Figure 2.10 shows the attack rate against the number of days after the initial outbreak
under three different strategies: optimal mixed strategy, full-prioritized strategy, and full-
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non-prioritized strategy when the vaccine supply level is 40% and R0 = 5. Individual-
based stochastic simulation (displayed in solid lines) is used to verify the output of the ODE
systems (displayed in dashed lines). Both methods suggest the same result: optimal mixed
strategy significantly reduces the attack rate throughout the outbreak and leads to an early
containment. For example, with full-prioritized strategy, the attack rate at containment
is above 10% and the outbreak starts to contain at around Day 200. The optimal mixed
strategy can achieve an overall attack rate of 5.35% (465,000 in population) and bring
























Figure 2.10: Smallpox: attack rate under 3 vaccination strategies with ODE and simulation.
Figure 2.11 compares the effect of delay in supply of vaccines, when R0 = 5, initial
infection is 1%, and the vaccine supply level is 40% dispensed with the optimal mixed
strategy. In case of no delay, the peak of the daily prevalence of disease appears at Day 15
with 1.60% maximum and starts to reduce afterward. If the vaccine supply is delayed by 3
weeks, the number of infectious population will reach a peak at Day 30 with 2.68% max-
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imal prevalence. The longer the vaccines are delayed, the later the highest peak appears
since the spread of disease is not effectively controlled before the arrival of vaccines and
the infectious population keeps growing. Besides the longer time needed to achieve con-
tainment, the delay of vaccine supply also significantly increases the cumulative infections.
Therefore, healthcare departments and decision makers should closely monitor possible in-
fectious disease outbreak and produce or order vaccines in the early stage of the outbreak
























Figure 2.11: Smallpox: daily prevalence with delayed supply of vaccines.
To better understand the impact of the delay of initial vaccine supply in containing the
smallpox outbreak, we contrast the overall attack rate and mortality rate of three different
supply scenarios under a time of delay ranging from 0 to 3 weeks assuming optimal mixed
dispensing strategy in all scenarios with R0 = 5 and 1% initial infection. The result is
shown in Figure 2.12. With increasing initial delay, the final attack and mortality rate
also increases in all three scenarios: with no initial delay of vaccine supply, the attack
rates of the three supply levels are 9.32%, 6.97%, 5.35%, respectively; when the vaccines
are delayed by 3 weeks, the attack rates by containment become 12.32%, 10.13%, and
8.34%, an increase of over 30% in all cases. This result again underscores the importance
of the early availability of vaccines in infectious disease outbreaks and suggests that the
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Figure 2.12: Smallpox: overall attack and mortality rate with delayed supply of vaccines.
Figure 2.13 shows the optimal switch triggers of mixed strategy corresponding to dif-
ferent basic reproduction number, initial percentage of infection, and the level of vaccine
supply. The left panel shows that the optimal switching trigger drops below 100% in all
combinations of (R0, α) when the vaccine supply level exceeds 18%. This conclusion can
simplify the determination of optimal switch trigger in real emergencies: when the level of
vaccine supply is below 18%, all of them should be dispensed to high-risk population; the
switch between strategies needs to be considered only when the vaccine supply exceeds this
threshold. The right panel is a magnified version of the region when the optimal switching
trigger begins to decrease, and the vaccine supply levels at which the optimal switch trigger
starts to drop are almost identical. This conclusion is also supported by the result displayed
in Table 2.5. It shows the maximum vaccine supply level for dispensing all vaccines to
the high-risk group under each combination of basic reproduction number and percentage
of initial infection. It suggests that the performance of the mixed strategy is quite robust
against the model parameters. This property is particularly useful in promoting the usage
of mixed strategy: when combating with other types of infectious disease outbreaks, even if
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the estimations ofR0 and initial infection may not be accurate, it does not have a significant
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Figure 2.13: Smallpox: optimal switch triggers under different parameters and vaccine
supply levels.
Table 2.5: Smallpox: maximum vaccine supply level under which g∗ = 1
(R0, α) R0 = 5 R0 = 6 R0 = 7
α = 0.5 18.6% 18.6% 18.6%
α = 1.0 18.5% 18.5% 18.4%
α = 1.5 18.4% 18.3% 18.3%
Figure 2.14 shows the attack and mortality rate at containment under three vaccine
supply levels at optimal mixed strategies against the dispensing efficiency at vaccine clinics.
When the throughput efficiency is higher than 60%, the impact on controlling efficiency of
the outbreak is negligible; however, when the dispensing efficiency drops below 40%, the
attack rate and mortality rate will increase significantly. Therefore, maintaining a high
dispensing efficiency at all vaccine clinics with limited resources is crucial in containing
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disease outbreaks. Managers of vaccine clinics and PODs should optimally allocate the
available resource to achieve the maximal throughput possible and train the healthcare






































Figure 2.14: Smallpox: attack and mortality rate under different throughput efficiencies
using optimal mixed strategy.
In our model, the clients visiting vaccine clinics or PODs need to be triaged and deter-
mine if they are infectious and need treatment or quarantine, or they are ready to receive
vaccines. The accuracy of this triage process will also impact the trend of disease outbreak
and the determination of optimal switch trigger. There are two types of errors at the triage
station: Type I error (false positive), i.e., incorrectly identify the non-infectious individuals
as infectious; Type II error (false negative), i.e., failure to identify the infectious individ-
uals. Figure 2.15 shows the impact of the triage errors. The left panel shows the change
of attack and mortality rates under three vaccines supply levels operated with the optimal
mixed strategy against the triage accuracy with respect to Type II error. At 100% accuracy
(no Type II errors), the overall attack rates are 9.32%, 6.97%, 5.35%; at 50% accuracy, the
attack rates become 9.46%, 7.17%, and 5.49%. The mortality rates show similar trends.
Therefore, with decreased triage accuracy regarding false negative, the number of infec-
tions and mortalities will slightly increase, as the vaccine clinics and PODs fail to quaran-
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tine some infectious individuals and administrate vaccines to them, which has no protective
effect. The right panel shows the optimal switch trigger with respect to the triage accuracy
of Type I and Type II errors ranging from 90% to 100%. Though the accuracy with respect
to false negative has an impact on the number of infections and mortalities, it does not
significantly change the corresponding optimal switch trigger. On the other hand, the opti-
mal switch trigger decreases as the triage accuracy with respect to false positive decreases
(when triage accuracy is 90%, the optimal trigger for the three levels of supply is 75.27%,
41.17%, and 24.13%, as opposed to 86.85%, 48.25%, and 29.92% when the accuracy is
100%). Since more healthy/susceptible individuals are triaged as infectious and send to
hospitalization without dispensing vaccines, fewer vaccines will be dispensed, and the time
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Figure 2.15: Smallpox: effect of triage accuracy at the PODs/vaccine clinics.
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Discussion
In this study, we propose a generic modeling framework for infectious disease outbreaks
with human interventions. We focus on the scenario of smallpox outbreaks and study
the effect of different vaccination strategies due to the limited supply of vaccine on the
overall attack and mortality rate. We propose the idea of optimal switch trigger, which
represents the percentage of high-risk population been vaccinated before switching to a
non-prioritized vaccination strategy. We incorporate both the compartmental model for
disease propagation and vaccine queuing model and develop numerical optimization on
the framework. To ensure the credibility and realism, we use the data from our past time-
motion study to populate the model parameters and run the simulation for the population in
the state of Georgia. Sensitivity analyses are included to investigate the impact of various
perturbation in implementing the optimal mixed vaccination strategy, including the delay
of vaccine supply and inaccuracy in triage.
Our analyses suggest that the optimal mixed vaccination strategy outperforms the full-
prioritized or full-non-prioritized strategies in terms of minimizing overall attack and mor-
tality rate under different combinations of model parameters and availability of vaccines.
When the vaccine supply is limited, all vaccines should be dispensed to high-risk groups
for best containment results; when the vaccine supply exceeds a threshold, a switch in the
dispensing strategy can be favorable and results in less attack and mortality rate. Delay of
availability of vaccines can have a significant impact on the trend of the disease outbreak
and may result in an increase in cumulative infectious population, thus early intervention
and availability of vaccines are crucial in containing disease outbreaks. The result of im-
plementing the optimal mixed strategy can also be influenced by various factors, including
the operation efficiency at vaccine clinics/PODs, and the triage accuracy. Though the opti-
mal switch trigger is robust to some of the parameters, public health departments still need
to ensure the efficiency of vaccine dispensing and the accuracy of triage via the usage of
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electronic health records (EHR), electronic scanning technologies, and optimal design of
POD layout and allocation of healthcare workers to achieve the best containment result.
This modeling framework is highly flexible: it is not constrained to a single type of
disease or intervention method. To model different types of diseases, e.g., vector-borne
diseases like dengue and yellow fever, or food-borne disease like cholera, decision makers
need just to plug in the corresponding structure for the compartmental model and estima-
tions of parameters based on the biological facts, and use the modeling framework and
computational engine to derive the optimal switch trigger for the best mixed vaccination
strategy. In addition, our definition of optimal switch trigger integrates not only the prop-
erty of disease propagation itself but the vaccine supply and operations in the actual vaccine
dispensing operations as well. Other important factors impact the decision-making process
are also highlighted in the sensitivity analysis, making it a practical and effective tool to
use in real emergencies.
With increasing danger of exposing to disease outbreaks worldwide and insufficient
supply or even unavailability of vaccines, it remains a challenge to determine the best way
to protect more people with limited resources. Instead of focusing on a microscopic view
of immunology effect prediction on the individual level for optimal utilization of vaccines,
we tackle this problem in a macroscopic view of analyzing the strategies for dispensing.
One advantage of this approach is that the result is almost independent of how the vac-
cines work; decision-makers just need to know the overall vaccine effectiveness to derive
the optimal switching trigger. Also, sensitivity analyses indicate that the optimal switch
trigger is highly robust against multiple parameters, thus a near-optimal result can be easily
achieved even when accurate estimations of model parameters are not immediately avail-
able. This makes our modeling framework more attractive in practical usages and enables
governments and healthcare departments to make a rapid reaction in case of emergencies.
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Though we use smallpox outbreak as an example to demonstrate the usage of our mod-
eling framework, the conclusion can easily be generalized to contain different types of
infectious disease outbreaks. For example, we apply a similar modeling strategy to op-
timize the medical resource allocation in the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa during
2014 to 2015; the similar approach was also applied to study the containment strategy of
the Zika virus outbreak in Brazil and Puerto Rico. The current yellow fever outbreak in
Brazil, Angola, Uganda, and DR Congo is proven difficult to control due to various rea-
sons: changing the climate, insufficient insect repellent or pesticide to control the mosquito
population, and insufficient supply of vaccines. Currently, there is only one manufacturer
of the yellow fever vaccine in the U.S., and the shortage of vaccines is likely to continue
until mid-2018 due to the delay of manufacturing [117, 151]. This signifies the impor-
tance of our work, as it provides a way to maximize the effect of protection using available
vaccines. The generic model for the vector-borne disease can be plugged into the generic
modeling framework with intervention and provides the optimal switch trigger given the
current supply level of vaccines and the proper segmentation of risk groups. The result-
ing strategy and policy may have a major impact on the trend of the current yellow fever
outbreak, and protect population health in a broader region.
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CHAPTER 3
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR BIOSURVEILLANCE AND OPERATIONS
Biosurveillance and emergency medical operations are crucial during public health emer-
gencies. Public health administrators need to understand the current situation of the emer-
gency, check the availability and inventory of resources to mitigate emergencies, and evalu-
ate different intervention strategies and choose the most effective one to implement. Due to
the nature of public health emergencies, these decisions need to be made in real time with
minimal errors. Computerized decision support systems and information technologies are
reliable and efficient for these applications. They are widely used in multiple public health
applications to facilitate and enhance the decision-making process for better mitigation re-
sults and population protection. In this chapter, we discuss a decision support system suite
for biosurveillance and operations: the RealOpt suite. We focus on one module in the suite,
RealOpt-Regional, and discuss its system design and applications.
RealOpt is an interactive web-based real-time decision support suite. The system inte-
grates visualization, information and cognitive analytics, and dynamic large-scale compu-
tational modeling and optimization tools that allow public health emergency preparedness
coordinators to determine optimal response facilities and locations, resource needs and
supply routes, and population flow in real time. With an eye towards flexibility and fu-
ture system expansion, RealOpt is designed in modular format allowing direct linkage to
multiple functional modules. Currently, the system has twelve modules covering emer-
gency response preparedness and operations for biological, chemical, radiological/nuclear
incidents, biosurveillance, epidemiology, and decontamination models, operations logistics
and networks, a real-time crowd sourcing data feed, and evacuation planning. RealOpt has
been used for biodefense and H1N1 regional planning and operations, regional flood and
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hurricane responses, 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster relief, 2011 Japan Fukushima disaster,
2014-2015 Ebola containment assistance and after-event public health preparedness train-
ing in West Africa, and current Zika virus containment analysis. The fast solution engines
enable real-time use for rapid decision and scenario analysis, since it requires only one
CPU minute to determine an optimal network of facilities and resource needs to serve a
population of over 10 million.
3.1 Introduction
Planning for a catastrophe involving a disease outbreak or mass casualties [27] is an on-
going challenge for first responders and emergency managers. They must make critical
decisions on treatment distribution points and staffing levels, and gauge the potential im-
pact on affected populations in a compressed window of time when seconds could mean life
or death. Although extensive efforts have been made to plan for a worst-case scenario on
the local, regional and national scale, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found gaps still exist [99]. While many states have made progress in planning for mass
casualty events, many have noted concerns related to maintaining adequate staffing levels
and accessing other resources necessary to effectively respond.
After outbreaks of potential public health emergencies, immediate and aggressive re-
sponses must be carried out. This includes medical countermeasures dispensing [118, 208]
to mitigate possible deaths and to control epidemic. Besides dispensing medication, “ser-
vice constructs” for food and water distribution, temporary shelters, medical care, screen-
ing and registry, and decontamination may also be required. Without loss of generality,
we call such sites point-of-dispensing sites (PODs). These are the places where affected
individuals come to receive services.
While dispensing medical countermeasures and providing medical services require spe-
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cific healthcare personnel, distribution of food and water and other personal needs can be
carried out by other emergency workers and volunteers. Nonetheless, both types of services
share key elements: resources are scare, time is precious, risk is uncertain and evolving,
there is a large affected population to serve, and the on-the-ground conditions can be ex-
ceedingly stressful, for the impacted population and for the emergency workers. To maxi-
mize the throughput that can be served under limited resources of labor, time, and potential
damaged infrastructure, PODs must be established such that they are flexible, scalable,
sustainable, and agile for operations continuity and fluidity. Policy and decision makers
must determine where to establish a network of sites to achieve the maximum overall ben-
efit. Further, POD layout must be designed to facilitate the best operations workflow and
throughput while minimizing resource requirements.
CDC’s Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) is designed to enhance preparedness in the
nation’s largest population centers to effectively respond to large-scale public health emer-
gencies needing life-saving medications and medical supplies. State and large metropoli-
tan public health departments develop, test, and maintain plans to quickly receive medi-
cal countermeasures from CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile and distribute them to local
communities. RealOpt is designed and used by many such departments to assist in these
efforts.
For a potential anthrax response, the goal of dispensing countermeasures to the affected
population within 48 hours of dispensing decision presents real challenges. A commercial
system that offers a discrete event simulation tool for scenario analysis, but takes over 10
hours to generate a feasible solution per scenario, is not suitable for real-time planning.
In contrast, scenario analysis and resource optimization in RealOpt is typically completed
under one minute, so is well-suited for real-time planning.
115
RealOpt is an interactive online software enterprise for large-scale regional medical
dispensing and emergency preparedness and responses. It features interactive visualization
tools to assist with spatial understanding of important landmarks in the region, assess the
population densities and demographic makeup of the region, and identify potential facility
locations. It also features backend mathematical models for large-scale facility location,
resource allocation optimization, and dynamic disease propagation problems. The system
is equipped with novel rapid solution engines for strategic and operational planning, real-
time dynamic optimization, and epidemiological analysis.
In the following sections, we first describe the system architecture and design of Re-
alOpt. Next, the system modules are presented, beginning with functionalities that relate to
the user experience, and moving on to functionalities that pertain to managing geographi-
cal boundaries; facility location and population assignment; ZIP code and population com-
position; multi-modality dispensing; POD layout design and resource allocation; disease
propagation analysis and biosurveillance; and regional information sharing, reverse report-
ing, tracking and monitoring, and resupply. Application of the system to planning for mass
dispensing for anthrax response, and to planning and responding to actual disasters will be
briefly presented. The section concludes with a discussion of future work and challenges.
3.2 System Architecture and Design
With flexibility and expansion in mind, RealOpt is designed in modular form (Figure 3.1)
and allows direct linkage to functional modules. Currently, it is composed of twelve pri-
mary modules for integrating system interactivity, client-server architecture, optimization,
and policy/decision support. The foundation web-component in the systems design is the
RealOpt-Regional module.









































Figure 3.1: RealOpt suite: system modules.
Google Maps API along with a webpage are incorporated to provide the primary I/O func-
tionalities. On the server, a rapid hybrid large-scale algorithm that couples features of
a combinatorial genetic algorithm and an adaptive greedy approach is implemented as a
solution engine for optimization of the network of facility sites and population flow and as-
signment. The intensive optimization computation is performed on the server, and requires
no extra computing effort from the client. The user’s system is used primarily for webpage
display and object rendering on the map.
Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) with basic access authentication is used for
sending and receiving requests asynchronously. In RealOpt-Regional, a large-scale facility
location problem may take seconds or a minute to initiate and solve. AJAX enables sending
the optimization request from the client to the server wherein users do not have to wait for
response from the server during optimization. Users at this point are free to explore other
features in RealOpt-Regional. Further, even if the client becomes disconnected from the
server, the user can still retrieve the optimization results. Potential internet disruption is
unavoidable; hence this feature is very appealing and important. While the connection
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can be manually or automatically re-built, the running progress and solutions will not be
accessible unless another request is sent from client web browser to the server. AJAX
enables users to obtain updated running progress or optimization results once the program
runs to completion.
Java Native Interface (JNI) is employed to link multiple modules on the server to
complete the backend computation and interface. The system architecture is designed so
that only the junction module needs modification when updating the solution engine. A


























Figure 3.2: RealOpt-Regional: schematic design.
3.3 System Modules and Functionalities
We briefly describe some of the RealOpt system modules and functionalities below.
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3.3.1 Interactive User Experience
We incorporate the graphical interactivity enabled by Google Maps JavaScript API as part
of the I/O functionalities. With up to 100,000 map loads per 24 hours, Google Maps
JavaScript API provides an efficient and stable mapping environment for users. This mod-
ule equips users with spatial understanding of important landmarks in the planning and
surrounding regions. Also, without the need for prerequisite knowledge in mathematical
programming, users are empowered to build, optimize, and evaluate service networks in a
graphical visualization environment. They can interact with the map by selecting jurisdic-
tions, adding/removing potential PODs (as markers), defining dispensing constraints (e.g.,
capacity constraints in each facility, and travel distance/time constraints), and highlighting
population served, household characteristics and various parameters (e.g., average number
of members per family; ethnicity/language represented in the population). In the backend,
the associated mathematical model will be built automatically and sent to the server for
optimization.
Other capabilities are implemented to allow users to manage their files on the secured
server directly from their web browser (e.g. adding, saving, uploading, and removing).
This creates a user experience like that of using a PC-application even though it is in the
web environment. The interactivity is designed to be compatible with mobile tablet de-
vices. Figure 3.3 shows the interface of RealOpt-Regional for public health emergency
preparedness coordinators and planners. On the left is a Google map, and on the right are
six function panels: “Jurisdiction”, “POD (Marker)”, “Optimization” (Facility Location),
“DrawPolygon”, “Multimodes”, and “Twitter”. Help files and step-by-step practice scenar-
ios are provided to guide users in building their own planning cases and to familiarize them
with usage of the system.
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Figure 3.3: RealOpt-Regional: main planning interface.
3.3.2 Geographical Boundaries
Through ArcGIS, RealOpt-Regional can display the geographical county boundaries of
the United States. Emergency response planners can select and define their planning area
spatially. Demographics such as population and density of each county are also provided
to complete the necessary input when planners are building and optimizing the dispens-
ing/service networks. City boundaries can be defined by free drawing polygon tools “Draw-
Polygon” on the map. This enables RealOpt-Regional to work compatibly with the Cities
Readiness Initiative to enhance preparedness of our nation’s largest cities and metropolitan
statistical areas. The flexibility of users manually drawing planning areas also ensures that
the heterogeneity of population densities between cities and counties can be considered in
building the dispensing networks. Further, such a free drawing feature is critical for inter-
national sites (e.g., the disaster response effort for the 2010 Haiti earthquake) where pop-
ulations are on the move, and affected regions are dynamic. The drawing process, which
includes tools for adding/deleting a vertex, and removing and modifying the polygon shape,
simply amount to a series of clicking and dragging operations on the map. Users can save
their drawings for future use. Figure 3.4 illustrates an example use of “DrawPolygon” in
outlying the boundary of the city of Chicago.
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Figure 3.4: RealOpt-Regional: user-defined boundary of the city of Chicago.
3.3.3 Network of Service, Locations and Population Flow and Assignment
Once a region is selected or drawn, users can input potential PODs by loading a file with
addresses, input the addresses interactively, or simply drag-and-drop the POD markers onto
the region. Physical constraints on the facility must be modeled, e.g., capacity of a facility
cannot be violated (e.g., parking capacity, fire codes, and building regulations limit the
total number of individuals that can be present simultaneously inside a facility). Users can
specify this globally for all PODs, or more commonly, they can specify the value for each
POD. Travel distance, household factors, and time for completing services at the facilities
can also be input.
Various objectives are incorporated within the RealOpt-Regional computational en-
gines. In the event of catastrophic incidents, it is critical that PODs are strategically located
to allow easy access by the affected public. Hence, minimizing transportation time and
distance is one critical objective. Further, the setup and operating costs of PODs cannot be
neglected. In our model, setup costs and travel time form the composite objective criteria.
A POD must be accessible by service workers. It should include a good communication
infrastructure, and must be readily protected by law-enforcement personnel. The facility
must be capable of handling a large influx of people with good access routes for supply and
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resupply. The spatial maps allow the users to evaluate the surrounding POD areas to ensure
that candidate POD selections are deemed appropriate.
The planning area may include a set of counties and/or a composition of a free drawing
region. By default, it is discretized at 40-by-40 resolution. The population within the plan-
ning area is assumed to be distributed evenly, or it can be strategically specified. Once the
set of potential PODs are selected with desired parameters, RealOpt-Regional translates
this input into a facility location problem on the backend. Specifically, given a selected
jurisdiction and a regional population, under the capacity and travel distance constraints,
setup cost and travel distance/time as objectives, and the required completion time for pro-
tecting the chosen regional population, we must determine a) an optimal set of PODs and
their respective locations needed for cost-effective operations; and b) the population as-
signment to this optimal set of PODs.
The computational engine consists of a two-stage facility location integer program. The
first stage optimizes the number of facilities opened. This is formulated as a capacitated
POD-location problem COVER-CAP to ensure that at least two PODs are opened. If a
catastrophic event at one site necessitates shutting down a POD, the remaining location
can continue to carry out the emergency dispensing. The model ensures that each house-
hold will travel at most the maximum allowed travel distance and time, every household
is served, and that the capacity of the facility is not violated. COVER-CAP returns the
minimum total number of PODs needed. Next, the MINAVG-CAP problem is formulated
to minimize the travel distance and time over all households while keeping the number of
PODs fixed to the optimal value that the COVER-CAP problem determined. See [136] and
[142] for variations of the full IP formulations.
For a jurisdiction of about 20,000 households, current competitive commercial opti-
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mizers fail to solve any of the instances after running for several months of CPU time. The
difficulty is partly because facility location remains an NP-hard problem and partly due to
the diverse requirements of the facilities and the very mixed population densities. Using
recent computational advances for solving intractable facility-like instances [144], we were
able to solve instances ranging from 200,000 to 10 million variables within 40,000 CPU
seconds. To facilitate strategic and operational planning and real-time dynamic decision
analysis, we design a novel rapid solution engine that couples a combinatorial genetic al-
gorithm with an adaptive greedy search [141]. The optimization heuristic schema is shown
in Figure 3.5. The engine is implemented in C++. Algorithmically, users can wait until the
optimization is completed (usually takes only seconds), or they can interrupt the solution
process manually to obtain intermediate non-optimal solutions.
Figure 3.5: RealOpt-Regional: algorithmic flow of our facility location heuristic.
3.3.4 ZIP Code and Population Composition
By rearranging and analyzing ZIP code demographics and area boundaries, RealOpt-
Regional maintains a set of up-to-date census data bank that contains 32,036 postal-code
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areas in the United States. The system provides ZIP code based information including
regional demographics, social indicators, economic indicators, and boundary of ZIP code
areas.
After determining a set of optimal POD locations and population assignment, users can
query POD coverage based on demographics by overlaying the POD service area with all
adjacent ZIP code areas, and aggregating ZIP code based data by considering size of over-
lapping, and population density of each overlapped ZIP code area. POD coverage based
demographics are dynamic and dependent on user-defined parameters in optimizing the lo-
cations and the total number of facilities. Using this information, emergency planners can
identify appropriate personnel for each specific POD and/or mode of dispensing (e.g. pedi-
atric assistants, translators, transportation needs or mobile PODs for socially-disadvantaged
individuals). Figure 3.6 illustrates the population composition by overlapping POD cov-
erage with all adjacent ZIP code areas. We can identify demographics of the majority
population served by the POD.
Figure 3.6: RealOpt-Regional: POD demographics for 91311.
3.3.5 Multi-Modality Dispensing & Public-Private Partnership
The goal of mass dispensing is to protect the worried well (general population) efficiently
and effectively under time constraints. In an anthrax attack, it is important that the affected
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population receive antibiotic prophylaxis within 48 hours of the determination that an attack
has occurred, since the mortality rate for persons demonstrating symptoms of inhalation
anthrax is extremely high. Multiple dispensing modalities often must be employed to serve
the entire regional population rapidly [136, 142].
Open PODs (i.e., open to the public) can be drive-through or facility-based walk-
through. Special needs populations may need closed PODs on site. For example, nursing
homes, assisted living facilities, homeless shelters, hospitals, and prisons house many res-
idents for whom it would be inconvenient or inadvisable to travel to a public dispensing
facility.
Further, self-organized closed PODs should be promoted. Corporate offices with many
employees could protect their own. Once these sites receive prophylactic supplies, they
could set up a closed POD with their own healthcare staff and volunteers, or with public
health staff supplemented by the state. Several factors suggest that such closed PODs will
have fewer security concerns and will be easier to manage than public PODs. These factors
include familiarity with the environment and people (e.g., fellow residents/employees),
existing security measures including established checkpoints and previously authenticated
identification badges with photo and/or biometric markers, and less stress than having to
commute to a public POD.
Airports and hotels where many non-resident travelers can be found are also candi-
dates for setting up PODs. This is particularly important with infectious disease outbreak
to ensure that travelers are protected with medical countermeasures before they leave for
elsewhere. Universities can use their own health facilities (and if necessary, additional mo-
bile on-campus PODs provided by the state) to provide prophylaxis to on-campus students,
staff and faculty. Clearly, if large employers and medical facilities provide prophylaxis
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to their own employees, families, and patients, it will eliminate a high percentage of the
population (may be as high as 40% in some large cities) from visiting public PODs, thus
reducing the burden on these facilities.
POD markers in RealOpt-Regional can be marked as closed or open, drive-through
or walk-through, and with specific demographics needs. Currently the system maintains
a data bank of 2,000 homeless shelters, 4,200 universities and colleges, 5,128 airports,
12,881 high schools, 73,079 assisted living facilities, and 24,192 hotels. Public health
and emergency response planners are equipped with this information and can make better
decisions in constructing more cost-effective and efficient mass dispensing networks. Users
can also search specific business or facility types to explore options of dispensing sites.
3.3.6 POD Layout Design and Resource Allocation
RealOpt-POD [138, 139] was the first RealOpt module. It was designed and implemented
in 2003, and has been advanced through the years. It currently has over 10,000 public
health site users. Its users also include fire departments, police departments, and hospital
networks. Written entirely in Java, it is a stand-alone computerized decision support sys-
tem for facility layout, resource allocation, and intra-facility disease propagation analysis.
The real-time solution capability is supported by automatic graph drawing tools, and our
in-house large-scale simulator and optimizers. Since 2009, a branch version has been de-
veloped within the RealOpt web-based client-server architecture. It is also interfaced with
RealOpt-Regional. While the automatic graph-drawing tool and user interface are built into
applets and embedded in the webpage, just as RealOpt-Regional, the core computation for
optimization and large-scale simulation are powered by the server.
The linkage of RealOpt-POD and RealOpt-Regional allows users to design POD lay-
outs and perform resource allocation optimization on the spot once the network of facilities
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is determined. However, the standalone version RealOpt-POD is still in high demand since
planners do not need internet access to use it.
3.3.7 Radiological Module
RealOpt-CRC is designed in parallel to RealOpt-POD for population screening in response
to radiological/nuclear incidents. There are major overlaps in these two systems wherein
CRC incorporates the decontamination, bioassay and other processes that are critical for
radiological screening and population registry and protection. It was used in response to
the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi radiological disasters (See Section 3.4).
3.3.8 Biosurveillance
Large-scale dispensing of medical countermeasures has proven to be an effective way to
contain outbreaks of highly infectious diseases, such as smallpox, pneumonic plague, and
pandemic flu [118, 208]. Further, successful dispensing operations, such as optimizing
POD operations through RealOpt-POD, can help reduce resource requirements, shorten
patient waiting time and queues, and maximize throughput [139, 141]. However, the large
influx of individuals brought into these dispensing centers raises the potential risk of intra-
facility cross-infections. RealOpt supports surveillance of biological attacks or natural pan-
demics on three fronts:
* Intra-infectivity tracking. In the planning phase of a dispensing event, POD planners
and epidemiologists can employ RealOpt-POD for estimating the dynamics of intra-
POD infection under different scenarios of POD design and personnel allocation.
The epidemiology module integrates agent-based simulation within the discrete event
simulation platform, offering a powerful means to track an individual’s health status
within the dispensing operations;
* Case incidents tracking. In addition to providing the epidemiological estimates dur-
ing the planning stage, POD managers can report and register incidents via RealOpt
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in real time during the dispensing event. These numbers, along with the attached
timestamps, can provide valuable information in monitoring and containing the dis-
ease spread. They are also beneficial for epidemiologists to collect data and refine
model parameters in real time;
* Incorporation of plume models within regional planning. RealOpt-Regional allows
automatic import of plume models and biological-infected regional zones within the
planning region. Users can also import plume radius and coverage via the free draw-
ing panel. This information can be critical for population protection planning, al-
lowing planners to select proper/safe candidate sites (for shelters, medical service,
and/or dispensing) and estimate resources required for regional coverage.
Beyond strategic and operational planning, training and cost-effectiveness analysis, Re-
alOpt also offers various information sharing/exchange and tracking capabilities. Specifi-
cally, it allows users to:
* Input medical supply burn rates. The data will be registered with a timestamp. This
allows regional commanders to oversee the dispensing process across the affected
region, re-direct populations as necessary, and order re-supplies appropriately;
* Perform real-time POD reconfiguration using current service performance informa-
tion through the service distribution estimator in RealOpt-POD;
* Report case incidents for disease monitoring and derivation of mitigation strategies;
* Perform reverse information sharing by highlighting traffic and road conditions in
surrounding areas to alert regional managers of necessary steps to re-route trans-
portation or re-direct citizens;
* Input plume information to alert populations of potential risks and guide them to stay
outside the plume zone(s).
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The information can be used by multiple stakeholders at different levels. Regional
commanders are empowered with multi-level ground knowledge and performance mea-
surements that will facilitate expediting operations, mobilizing resources, and containing
threats and spread of disease.
3.3.9 Multi-Level End-Users Access
RealOpt can be used by both emergency preparedness personnel and the public to obtain
service site information. Multiple levels of authorization are used to control proper access.
In general, emergency preparedness personnel can:
* Determine a network of optimal service/dispensing locations and the optimal combi-
nation of dispensing modalities (e.g. combinations of drive-through, walk-through,
mobile, open and closed PODs) for regional preparedness;
* Review demographics at each site and identify the appropriate personnel (e.g. trans-
lators, pediatric assistants) needed for effective dispensing;
* Determine in real-time a resupply schedule for medical countermeasures across the
network through real-time feeds of product usage;
* Determine the closest facility and feasible traffic routes (incorporating inverse road
conditions) to resupply, and to transport sick individuals from PODs to respective
hospitals for treatment;
* Identify region-wide budget and labor needs to accommodate an emergency, and
determine recruitment needs of healthcare workers and volunteers;
* Perform economic analysis on multi-modality variations.
Emergency preparedness personnel can be further categorized into three levels: “emer-
gency planner”, “RSS (receive-sort-staging) manager”, and “regional commander”. Emer-
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gency planners are provided with general functionalities mentioned above; RSS managers
can model RSS sites on the map, and can provide supply when requested. Regional com-
manders can further manage inventory at each site, review inventory summary over all
sites, review item information summary, and manage shipments whenever necessary. In-
dividual POD managers can login to design POD layout and optimize POD performance
via RealOpt-POD. They can register/report burn rates, case incidents, and request resupply.
Epidemiologists work along POD and Regional commanders to analyze disease spread and
design mitigation strategies.
The system will be open to the public only during an actual event to obtain driving
directions to primary and backup PODs that are specifically assigned to them. They can
also review relevant information related to the specific medical countermeasures dispensed,
and to register for the medication.
3.4 Applications
RealOpt has been used for planning for mass dispensing for anthrax response, actual vac-
cination events for seasonal flu, 2009/2010 H1N1 response, and hepatitis B vaccination.
The system has also been tailored for the 2010 Haiti earthquake emergency response, the
2011 Japan Tohoku-Fukushima radiological disaster efforts, the 2014 Ebola response and
training operations, and the current Zika virus strategic containment analysis.
3.4.1 Biodefense Mass Dispensing Regional Planning
To illustrate the strategic capability and importance of RealOpt, we briefly describe the
biodefense planning and capability and resource requirement estimates for New York City.
The city consists of five counties: Bronx County (Bronx), Kings County (Brooklyn), New
York County (Manhattan), Queens County (Queens), and Richmond County (Staten Is-
land). According to the U.S Census Bureau, the total population in New York City was
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estimated to be 8,550,405 in 2015. The land area was 303 square miles, and the number of
persons per square mile is 27,603. Among the entire population, 47.60% speak languages
other than English at home.
For brevity, we illustrate only one analysis here where the maximum travel distance
is set to 15 miles, and the physical capacity of each facility ranges from 1,000 to 2,000
per hour, reflecting the actual site specification. Two 12-hour shifts are operating at each
location to ensure that the population is protected within 24 hours. Using census data, it is
assumed that an average household has 2.57 people.
Figure 3.7 shows a POD network returned by RealOpt-Regional that covers 96.3%
of the New York City population. A total of 101 PODs are needed, each runs two 12-
hour shifts. Figure 3.8 illustrates the percentage of non-English speaking (Hispanic/Latino
and Asian) population served by one of these POD locations. Using this information,
emergency planners can contrast the type and number of interpreters needed to execute the
necessary POD operations.
Figure 3.7: RealOpt-Regional: Optimal POD facility network for New York City.
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Figure 3.8: RealOpt-Regional: ZIP code-based demographical information.
Next, RealOpt-POD is used to design POD floorplan and predict the optimal resource
allocation, based on the POD operations service distributions collected from local jurisdic-
tion. Figure 3.9 shows the number and types of workers needed to cover 96.3% of New
York City population with or without splitting the PODs into Hispanic-operated versus non-
Hispanic operated. The number of interpreters in the splitting case is significantly smaller
than the non-splitting case. This indicates that the PODs in the splitting case are easier to




















Figure 3.9: RealOpt-Regional: Number and types of workers needed to cover 96.3% of
New York City population.
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3.4.2 Real-Life Disaster Response Effort
Large-scale disaster and humanitarian relief efforts (e.g., in response to earthquakes, hur-
ricanes, forest fires) where homes are destroyed, critical infrastructures are damaged, and
tens of thousands or millions of people’s lives are affected, require rapid establishment
of “service constructs”. These service constructs serve as camp shelters for the displaced
population; as distribution nodes for receiving supplies for on-the-ground responders; as
dispensing sites for handing out food and water to the affected population; and as hospital
tents for medical care of the injured and sick.
In 2010, RealOpt was tailored to RealOpt-Haiti for part of Haiti’s emergency response
efforts. In this case, distribution nodes were established, with affected populations esti-
mated by region based on on-the-ground dynamics and movement of the population. Fig-
ure 3.10 shows the supplies arriving at the airport and seaport, and the population density
across the 11 in-land distribution nodes. The system allows distribution optimization and
provides the responders the items and quantities of shipment to each distribution node. Fig-
ure 3.11 shows the distribution paths and supply items and quantities from the supply nodes
(airport and seaport) to the in-land distribution nodes returned by RealOpt-Haiti. The sys-
tem was also used in optimizing resource allocation and operations within each distribution
node, temporary medical tents, and camps/shelters for the displaced population.
Figure 3.10: RealOpt-Regional: supplies at airport and seaport and the estimated popula-
tion density across the distribution nodes.
The Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent radiological incidents present a
133
Figure 3.11: RealOpt-Regional: distribution paths and supply quantities.
glimpse of the devastating impacts of cascading failures and a catastrophic event in an
advanced industrialized society. This is the first major hydrologic release of radiation
isotopes and is the largest-ever release to the oceans. The cause was not a single event, but
rather a cascading failure and the release persisted for a sustained period.
In Japan, while citizens have been educated about evacuation and response procedures
for earthquakes and tsunamis, there is a serious knowledge gap regarding strategies and
emergency guidelines for radiological emergencies, rapid screening and decontamination,
even among emergency responders and citizens living close to the nuclear plants. During
the Fukushima disaster, citizens learned very little through public media or from govern-
ment officials. The mitigation efforts for radiation exposure and health risks were further
clouded as a result of conflicting information released by the Japanese and the US govern-
ment (e.g., on the radius for evacuation).
First month after March 11, 2011, over 3,000 workers were working around-the-clock
on various emergency issues related to the failed nuclear plants. Lack of planning led to
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missed screening of workers. To facilitate the disaster response effort, RealOpt-Regional
was used to determine the sites and the numbers of shelters needed to house the displaced
population, while RealOpt-CRC was deployed for rapid screening, decontamination and
health registry and monitoring for emergency workers and the affected population.
RealOpt-CRC was used to design the optimal process layout for screening and decon-
tamination. Some key tasks include detection of the presence of radioactive contamination
on the body or clothing, removal of the contamination (decontamination), detection of the
intake of radioactive materials into the body, registration/tracking, and medical consulta-
tion. The screening sites must include staff members and equipment capable of detecting
contamination through beta/gamma portal monitors; monitoring for general contamination
using hand-held instruments, fielding questions and addressing all concerns; and distribut-
ing event and follow-up information. Further, when internal contamination assessment is
to be performed, licensed physicians are needed to carry out the procedure properly. Table
3.1 contrasts the results using two screening layouts, namely by switching the ordering on
the use of portal monitor and hand-held screening instruments. The results underscore the
importance of optimizing process design and the resource allocation, which has significant
impact on the overall operations efficiency and systems performance.
Table 3.1: RealOpt-CRC: contrasting throughput for two different layouts for a screening
and decontamination center.
Layout 1 Layout 2
Throughput in 12 hours 52,982 40,217
Ave. time spent 8 minutes 15 minutes
Greeting 8 workers 6 workers
Paperwork 8 workers 6 workers
Portal monitor 16 3
Hand-held device 12 43
Decontamination 46 34
Bioassays 10 stations 8 stations
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3.5 Challenges and Conclusions
Modeling and optimizing public health infrastructure involve elements of resource allo-
cation under risk, uncertainty, and time pressure; large-scale supply-chain management;
transportation and operational logistics; and medical treatment and population protection.
The operations must be supported by an effective communication infrastructure. There is
a necessity for vertical and horizontal integration and communication, where federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, private and business stakeholders work towards a common goal of a
resilient public health system. The infrastructure must be flexible, scalable, and sustainable
to support an effective and timely response, and to mount rapid recovery and mitigation
operations.
In this study, we discuss a novel interactive web-based public health “digital” informat-
ics decision support system, RealOpt, a suite of tools for real-time emergency preparedness
planning, medical countermeasures dispensing, and public health surveillance. We also
highlight its public health information sharing, reverse reporting, incidents tracking and
monitoring, and supply/resupply coordination capabilities. All these elements are critical
and essential for successful and effective response operations. We introduce herein Re-
alOpt’s usage in the Haiti and Japan Tohoku Disaster response efforts, the Ebola operations
for W. Africa, and the Zika containment strategies across various countries in the world.
The Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and its subsequent radiological incidents accentuate the
devastating impacts of cascading failures. One specific tragedy underscores the importance
of real-time on-the-fly planning and optimization during an unfolding event: On March
11, 30 response officials gathered on the upper floor and roof in the disaster management
headquarters for the town of Minamisanriku. The tsunami completely flooded the structure
and only 11 people survived.
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Coupled with Google Maps JavaScript API V3, RealOpt-Regional provides public
health emergency preparedness coordinators spatial understanding of the planning region,
empowers them in building a mathematical model for optimizing a service network in a
graphical visualization environment; and, more importantly, it solves the problem in real
time. The client-server architecture not only relieves the need for intensive computation
from system users, it also embodies the concept of system modularization and encapsu-
lation to maintain the extendibility of the solution engine without interfering with user
experience.
Designing a safe and cost-effective network of service constructs (shelters, medical
tents, point-of-dispensing PODs etc.) entails a complex process from planning to actual
execution. RealOpt-Regional requires only a web browser for authorized users to access
(including regional commanders, facility planners and managers, and epidemiologists), and
provides a common platform for public health workers from different governmental levels
(federal/state/local agencies). Using the RealOpt environment, stakeholders crucial to re-
sponse planning and execution can share information, interact and integrate their respective
components for decision/policy making within a trusted shared information environment.
RealOpt has been deployed to public health and emergency planners since December
2009. Currently there are over 200 regional commanders using RealOpt-Regional, most
of the users are regional program directors or state response coordinators in Public Health
or Emergency Management departments. There are over 10,000 RealOpt-POD site users.
RealOpt has been used for response to hurricane, fire, flood, and other public health criti-
cal missions including international disaster crises. Its use helps in protecting and saving
human lives.
We are currently integrating the standalone RealOpt-Evacuate into the online RealOpt
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system. RealOpt-Evacuate is a large-scale evacuation system that serves as a strategic-
based decision analysis support system in assisting regional evacuation operations, plan-
ning and training, in conjunction with population protection (medical countermeasures,
medical care, shelters and food supplies). We also distribute a standalone RealOpt-RSS
system, a software modeling, simulation and optimization tool for efficient logistics and
operations management of Receipt, Stage and Storage (RSS) facilities and regional dis-
tribution nodes for medical countermeasures or other emergency supplies. RealOpt-RSS
assists in planning quick and efficient strategies for processing medicines and/or equipment
from the receiving point of the RSS to RSS vehicles for delivery. The software includes a
warehouse design module, and specific computational modules related to the RSS facility,




Infectious diseases remain a major threat to the public health nowadays and accurate pre-
diction and immediate response at the initial stage of outbreaks are crucial to achieve early
containment and minimize total infections. The topic of this dissertation is to use mathe-
matical and computational methods to improve and advance the public health informatics,
especially in terms of controlling infectious disease outbreaks. We build a general-purpose
mathematical modeling framework for infectious disease outbreaks and use this modeling
framework to assist decision-making to achieve rapid containment of disease outbreaks. We
develop a real-time computerized decision support system for optimizing resource alloca-
tion and operations during emergency responses. This work starts with a theoretical math-
ematical model for epidemiology which is highly flexible and generalizable, then shows
how this modeling framework can be used in practice to facilitate decision-making when
combating with infectious disease outbreaks, and finally translates the theoretical model to
practical decision support tools for first responders.
Mathematical models with system dynamics and interactions are powerful tools to an-
alyze the trend of disease outbreaks and support real-time decision-making. However,
building epidemiology models from scratch during the emergency is not efficient and may
cause potential delays in response. We propose a general-purpose modeling framework
for the spread of infectious diseases. This modeling framework extends the traditional
compartmental models by categorizing each stage or compartment based on two different
criteria: passive or active; vulnerable, contagious, or unaffected, and establishing relation-
ships between stages based on their categorizations. We discuss models for two types of
infectious diseases: contact-based and vector-borne diseases. The modeling technique for
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vector-borne diseases can be generalized to depict the system dynamics for more than two
species, given the well-defined inter-group disease contact structures. We derive the basic
reproduction number of the system based on the method of the next-generation matrix. The
spread of infectious disease has intrinsic stochasticity due to the randomness in the behav-
ior of individuals and the heterogeneity among different population groups. Although the
proposed modeling framework is deterministic, stochasticity can also be introduced to it
using Langevin dynamics. All classical compartmental models can be derived from the
proposed metamodel, which describes the dynamics of the system with a compact formu-
lation and can be easily generalized and customized based on the biological properties and
environmental features of different infectious disease outbreaks. The proposed modeling
framework provides a high-level metamodel for epidemiology and enables the emergency
responders to rapidly build and evaluate disease models and evaluate the performance of
different containment strategies without the knowledge of the underlying mathematics.
We discussed how medical interventions can be introduced to the modeling framework
of epidemiology both implicitly and explicitly. If the process of medical interventions can
be treated as a black box, we can create new stages corresponding to the intervention pro-
cess by assigning proper values in all model matrices. On the other hand, we can model
the interventions in detail by segmenting the population into different groups. For exam-
ple, to model the effect of vaccination, we can separate the population into two groups:
outside and inside vaccine clinics. For the population outside the vaccine clinics, the pre-
vious disease propagation model will be used; for the population inside the vaccine clinics,
besides the natural propagation of the disease, the vaccination effect will also drive the tran-
sition between disease stages. This modeling method is suitable to study the effect of the
operations of healthcare facilities and point-of-dispensing sites (PODs) during emergency
outbreaks and identify the optimal operation strategies. Based on the models for human in-
terventions, optimization problems can be formulated to determine the optimal allocation
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of medical resources and compare the effects of different containment strategies. Instead
of treating all model matrices as constants, they can be modeled as time-variant variables
and the values are controllable through human interventions at a certain cost. Then op-
timization problems can be formulated and solved to achieve containment under various
constraints, assisting on-the-ground operations for disaster relief effort.
One major challenge in the application of this modeling framework is to accurately es-
timate model parameters. With the flexibility of the model, it can incorporate a very large
number of parameters to describe the system dynamics in high resolutions. Some parame-
ters can be obtained through the biological properties of the diseases, but other parameters
require estimations. With a high degree of freedom, improper estimations of model pa-
rameters may result in over-fitting. In practice, decision-makers should start with simple
but robust settings of the model and extend it to more complicated ones when such data
are available. Our previous research shows that simple models have sufficient predicting
accuracy in many cases and should be preferred when accurate parameter estimations are
not immediately available. Sensitivity analysis is also useful to determine the relevant im-
portance of different model parameters. One future research direction is to establish a data
pipeline to populate the model parameters or use machine learning techniques to estimate
model parameters. This can further automate the model fitting and evaluation process and
improve the robustness and accuracy of the prediction.
To facilitate the decision-making process during public health emergencies in real time,
we demonstrate the RealOpt suite, which consists of multiple modules to assist end-users at
different levels in formulating and solving difficult mathematical problems including facil-
ity location and resource allocation. Public health workers and emergency responders with-
out relative background knowledge can easily navigate through the graphical user interface
of the system, build models that reflect their respective situations, and obtain solutions as
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their guidance of designing and implementing emergency response plans. Additionally,
with multiple RealOpt modules linked together, users can design the plan hierarchically
from regional facility location optimization and logistics to the operational strategies and
inventory management of each individual dispensing site. This allows end-users at mul-
tiple levels to work on the same emergency response plan under a unified framework and
improves the overall efficiency.
Though the proposed modeling framework is highly generic and generalizable, there
are limitations. For example, the current setup does not allow stages to have outflows
caused by disease propagation and new infections combined. We sacrifice the capability
of modeling these edge cases for the simplicity of our modeling framework, though this
problem can be solved by defining two separate disease transition matrices. We point out
that more complicated models can still be expressed under our framework with carefully
quantified interactions between stages. Compartmental models and the corresponding ordi-
nary differential equations are not difficult to solve numerically in general, but the real-time
requirement of emergency response demands fast but accurate solutions. More theoretical
and computational investigations on this ODE-based modeling framework would be nec-
essary to further improve its performance and promote its usage. Approximation algorithm
and interpolation method are also potential solutions to achieve fast and accurate analyses
under the current framework. To cope with increasingly complicated scenarios in modern
public health emergencies, the computerized tools used in this field also need to be updated
continuously to reflect the recent development in emergency response and the complexity of
the situations. Besides the improvements in theoretical models and algorithms, emergency
response tools will also need to incorporate multiple data sources to better understand the
current situation and predict future trends for infectious disease outbreaks. Crowd-sourced
surveillance is becoming increasingly important with the advances of social networking.
With proper technologies, these data can serve as key inputs to the RealOpt suite to provide
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better model parameter estimations and more accurate intervention strategy evaluations.
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in Brazil and macular atrophy in a child with microcephaly,” The Lancet, vol. 387,
no. 10015, p. 228, 2016.
[205] N. Vogel, C. Theisen, J. P. Leidig, J. Scripps, D. H. Graham, et al., “Mining mo-
bile datasets to enable the fine-grained stochastic simulation of Ebola diffusion,”
Procedia Computer Science, vol. 51, pp. 765–774, 2015.
[206] J. Wallinga, M. Van Boven, and M. Lipsitch, “Optimizing infectious disease inter-
ventions during an emerging epidemic,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, vol. 107, no. 2, pp. 923–928, 2010.
[207] R. G. Webster, M. Peiris, H. Chen, and Y. Guan, “H5N1 outbreaks and enzootic
influenza,” Biodiversity, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 51–55, 2006.
[208] L. M. Wein, D. L. Craft, and E. H. Kaplan, “Emergency response to an anthrax at-
tack,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 100, no. 7, pp. 4346–
4351, 2003.
[209] WHO Ebola Response Team, “Ebola virus disease in West Africa — The first 9
months of the epidemic and forward projections,” The New England Journal of
Medicine, vol. 371, no. 16, pp. 1481–1495, 2014.
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